Columbia Law School

Scholarship Archive
Faculty Scholarship

Faculty Publications

2006

Capital Punishment and Capital Murder: Market Share and the
Deterrent Effects of the Death Penalty
Jeffrey Fagan
Columbia Law School, jfagan@law.columbia.edu

Franklin Zimring
University of California at Berkeley, zimring@law.berkeley.edu

Amanda Geller
Columbia University, abg2108@columbia.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, and the Law and Society
Commons

Recommended Citation
Jeffrey Fagan, Franklin Zimring & Amanda Geller, Capital Punishment and Capital Murder: Market Share
and the Deterrent Effects of the Death Penalty, 84 TEXAS L. REV. 1803 (2006).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/1424

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For more
information, please contact scholarshiparchive@law.columbia.edu.

Capital Punishment and Capital Murder: Market
Share and the Deterrent Effects of the Death Penalty
Jeffrey Fagan*

Franklin E. Zimring**
Amanda Geller***
I.

Introduction

A.

The New Deterrence
The modem debate on deterrence and capital punishment, now in its
fourth decade, was launched by two closely timed events. The first was the
1976 United States Supreme Court decision in Gregg v. Georgia,' which restored capital punishment after its brief constitutional ban following Furman
v. Georgia 2 in 1972.' In 1975, Professor Isaac Ehrlich published an influential article saying that during the 1950s and 1960s, each execution averted
eight murders.4 Although Ehrlich's article was a highly technical study prepared for an audience of economists, its influence went well beyond the
economics profession. Ehrlich's work was cited favorably in Gregg and later
was cited in an amicus brief filed by the U.S. Solicitor General in Fowler v.
North Carolina. No matter how carefully Ehrlich qualified his conclusions,
his article had the popular and political appeal of a headline, a sound bite,

Professor of Law and Public Health, Columbia University. Support for
this research was
provided by Columbia Law School, the University of California, Berkeley School of Law, and the
Open Society Institute. Garth Davies provided invaluable help in data analysis. Excellent research
assistance was provided by David Finkelstein, Jason Stramaglia, and Richard Oberto. Justin
Wolfers, Brandon Garrett, and the participants at the Texas Law Review Punishment Law and
Policy symposium provided helpful comments and advice. Thanks to Eva DeLuna Castro at the
Center for Public Policy Priorities for providing access to county data for Texas.
William Simon Professor of Law and Wolfen Distinguished Scholar, Boalt
Hall, University
of California at Berkeley.
...Doctoral Candidate, School of Social Work, Columbia
University.
1. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
2. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
3. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 169.
4. See Isaac Ehrlich, The DeterrentEffect of CapitalPunishment:A Question of Life and Death,
65 AM. ECON. REv. 397, 398 (1975); see also Isaac Ehrlich, CapitalPunishment and Deterrence:
Some Further Thoughts and Additional Evidence, 85 J. POL. ECON. 741 (1977) (continuing the
examination of the deterrent effect of capital punishment using cross-sectional data from several
states).
5. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 35, Fowler v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 904
(1976) (No. 73-7031).
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and a bumper sticker all rolled into one: "every execution deters eight
killings."
Reaction was immediate: Ehrlich's findings were sharply disputed in
academic forums such as the Yale Law Journal,6 launching an era of
contentious arguments in the press and in professional journals.7 In 1978, an
expert panel appointed by the National Academy of Sciences issued strong
criticisms of Ehrlich's work.8 Over the next two decades, economists and
other social scientists attempted (mostly without success) to replicate
Ehrlich's results using different data, alternative statistical methods, and
other design modifications that tried to address glaring errors in Ehrlich's
techniques and data. The accumulated scientific evidence from the NAS
report and these later studies
weighed heavily against the claim that
9
executions deter murders.

6. See David C. Baldus & James W.L. Cole, A Comparison of the Work of Thorsten Sellin and
Isaac Ehrlich on the DeterrentEffect of Capital Punishment,85 YALE L.J. 170, 171 (1975) (arguing
that a statistical study cannot prove that executions deter murders); William J. Bowers & Glenn L.
Pierce, The Illusion ofDeterrencein IsaacEhrlich 's Research on CapitalPunishment, 85 YALE L.J.
187, 205 (1975) (concluding that Ehrlich failed to provide any reliable evidence that the death
penalty deters murder); Isaac Ehrlich, Deterrence:Evidence and Inference, 85 YALE L.J. 209, 20910 (1975) (arguing that certain critiques of his work have "selectively deleted observations, utilized
an inferior regression specification, considered irrelevant variables and correlations, and revealed in
the process misunderstanding of elementary statistical concepts"); Editors' Introduction, Statistical
Evidence on the DeterrentEffect of Capital Punishment, 85 YALE L.J. 164, 169 (1975) (discussing
the debate surrounding statistical studies regarding deterrence effects of the death penalty and the
inherent vulnerability of complex statistical techniques).
7. There are numerous critiques of Ehrlich's work. See, e.g., Jeffrey Grogger, The Deterrent
Effect of CapitalPunishment: An Analysis of Daily Homicide Counts, 85 J. AM. STAT. ASS'N 295,
295 (1990) (arguing that studies focusing on the relationship between homicide rates and
executions, such as Ehrlich's, tend to yield ambiguous results); Edward E. Leamer, Let's Take the
Con Out of Econometrics, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 31, 41-42 (1983) (criticizing the methodology used
in analyzing the deterrent effect of capital punishment); Michael McAleer & Michael R. Veall, How
FragileAre FragileInferences? A Re-evaluation of the Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment, 71
REV. ECON. & STAT. 99, 102 (1989) (discussing Ehrlich's data set); Walter S. McManus, Estimates
of the DeterrentEffect of CapitalPunishment: The Importanceof the Researcher'sPriorBeliefs, 93
J. POL. ECON. 417, 425 (1985) (concluding that researchers' prior beliefs influence their
conclusions).
Support and extensions of Ehrlich's work exist as well. See, e.g., George A. Chressanthis,
CapitalPunishment and the DeterrentEffect Revisited: Recent Time-Series Econometric Evidence,
18 J. BEHAV. ECON. 81, 94 (1989) (upgrading Ehrlich's initial controversial results); James Peery
Cover & Paul D. Thistle, Time Series, Homicide, and the Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment,
54 S. EcoN. J. 615, 621 (1988) (arguing that the deterrence effect cannot be analyzed properly
without explicitly considering how the probabilities of punishment are defined); Stephen K. Layson,
Homicide and Deterrence: A Reexamination of the United States Time-Series Evidence, 52 S.
ECON. J. 68, 73-86 (1985) (updating Ehrlich's work with new data sets).
8. See Lawrence R. Klein et al., The DeterrentEffect of CapitalPunishment: An Assessment of
the Estimates, in DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL

SANCTIONS ON CRIME RATES 336, 336-60 (Alfred Blumstein et al. eds., 1978).
9. See William C. Bailey, Deterrence, Brutalization, and the Death Penalty: Another
Examination of Oklahoma's Return to CapitalPunishment, 36 CRIMINOLOGY 711, 729-32 (1998)
(concluding that media coverage of executions has no significant deterrent effect on homicide); Jon
Sorensen et al., CapitalPunishment andDeterrence:Examining the Effect of Executions on Murder
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The debate both revived and shifted within the past decade. Since 1996,
more than a dozen studies have been published claiming that each execution
can prevent anywhere from three to thirty-two homicides.' The new deterrence studies analyze data that span a twenty-year period since the
resumption of executions following the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Furman" and Gregg.'2 The claims of these new studies are far
bolder than the original wave of studies by Professor Ehrlich and his
students.13 Some claim that pardons, commutations, and exonerations cause
murders to increase. 14 One says that even murders of passion, among the
most irrational of lethal acts, can be deterred. 15 In short, these studies
suggest that the deterrent effects of capital punishment apparently are

in Texas, 45 CRiME & DELINQ. 481, 481-91 (1999) (finding no evidence of deterrence resulting
from capital punishment using Texas execution and murder rate data from 1984 through 1997).
10. See Appendix A for a list of recent studies that claim deterrent effects from execution in
the post-Gregg era. Three papers contest the claim that capital punishment deters murder.

Lawrence Katz and his colleagues report no significant deterrent effects of executions on murder
rates after controlling for prison conditions and other indicia of the overall performance of the
criminal justice system. See Lawrence Katz et al., Prison Conditions, Capital Punishment, and
Deterrence, 5 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 318, 339-40 (2003). John Donohue and Justin Wolfers

examined evidence of deterrent effects and found that "the existing evidence for deterrence is
surprisingly fragile." John J. Donohue & Justin Wolfers, Uses andAbuses of EmpiricalEvidence in

the Death Penalty Debate, 58 STAN. L. REv. 791, 794 (2005). Jon Sorensen and his colleagues
report no counter-deterrent effects on murder from a moratorium on capital punishment in Texas,
once a rich set of control variables on the causes and correlates of murder was included in the
analysis. See Jon Sorensen et al., supra note 9, at 481-91; see also JON SORENSEN & ROCKY
LEANN PILGRIM, LETHAL INJECTION: CAPITAL PUMSHMENT IN TEXAS DURING THE MODERN ERA

39-47 (2006) (re-analyzing Cloninger and Marchesini's claim that the moratorium resulted in an
increase in homicides); Dale 0. Cloninger & Roberto Marchesini, Execution and Deterrence: A
Quasi-ControlledGroup Experiment, 33 APPLIED ECON. 569 (2001).

11. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
12. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
13. Joanna Shepherd, an author of several studies finding a deterrent effect, has recently argued
before Congress that recent research has created a "strong consensus among economists that capital
punishment deters crime," going so far as to claim that "[t]he studies are unanimous." Terrorist
Penalties Enhancement Act of 2003: Hearing on H.R. 2934 Before the Subcomm. on Crime,
Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 10-11

(2004) (statement of Joanna M. Shepherd) [hereinafter Hearing], available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/printers/108th/93224.pdf. These conclusions were repeated
verbatim in recent testimony by Professor Paul Rubin, co-author on several recent studies also
reporting deterrent effects from executions. An Examination of the Death Penalty in the United
States: Hearing before the Senate Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and PropertyRights
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2006) (statement of Paul H. Rubin), available

at http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id= 1745&wit-id=4991.
14. See, e.g., H. Naci Mocan & R. Kaj Gittings, Getting Off Death Row: Commuted Sentences
and the Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment, 46 J.L. & ECON. 453, 474 (2003) (finding that

"[e]ach additional execution decreases homicides by about five, and each additional commutation
increases homicides by the same amount, while one additional removal from death row generates
one additional homicide").
15. Joanna M. Shepherd, Murders of Passion,Execution Delays, and the Deterrence of Capital
Punishment, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 283, 318 (2004).
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limitless, leading16 some proponents to offer execution as a cure-all for all
types of murder.
Both legal scholars and social scientists have transformed this new
social science evidence into calls for more executions that they claim will
save lives,17 and new rules that will remove procedural roadblocks and hasten
executions.18 Others challenge the scientific credibility of these new
studies, 19 and warn about the moral hazards and practical risks of capital
punishment.2 °
Obviously, the stakes are high in this latest round of the recurring
debate on deterrence. We think the new results are wrong, for a simple
reason. The measures of homicide used in the new deterrence studies are
overly broad: by studying whether punishments affect all homicides, these
studies fail to identify a more plausible target of deterrence-namely, those
homicides that are punishable by death. By broadening the target of the
search for deterrent effects, these studies have overestimated not just the
number of lives saved by deterrence, but whether any murders are averted by
the threat of execution. 2' In this study, we find no evidence of deterrence
when the effects of execution are estimated for the subset of homicides that
are most directly affected by execution.

16. Zhiqiang Liu, CapitalPunishment and the DeterrenceHypothesis: Some New Insights and
EmpiricalEvidence, 30 E. ECON. J. 237, 254 (2004).
17. Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Is Capital Punishment Morally Required? Acts,
Omissions, and Life-Life Tradeoffs, 58 STAN. L. REv. 703, 748-50 (2005); see also Posting of Gary
Becker to the Becker-Posner Blog, http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/archives/2005/12/ (Dec.
18, 2005, 06:02 PM) (citing the deterrence argument as more than convincing to support capital
punishment); Posting of Richard Posner to the Becker-Posner Blog, http://www.becker-posnerblog.com/archives/2005/12/ (Dec. 18, 2005, 07:53 PM) (synthesizing arguments based on recent
research into the powerful deterrent effect of the death penalty and noting that such values outweigh
factors opposing capital punishment).
18. See, e.g., Streamlined Procedures Act of 2005, S. 1088, 109th Cong. (2005); Criminal Alien
Deportation Improvements Act of 1995, H.R. 668, 104th Cong. (1995).
19. Donohue & Wolfers, supra note 10, at 794 (2005) (reviewing the main study cited by
Sunstein and Vermeule and finding that the evidence supporting deterrence is surprisingly tenuous);
see also Richard Berk, New Claims About Executions and General Deterrence: D~jd Vu All Over
Again?, 2 J. EMPIRIcAL L. STUD. 303, 304 (2005) (contending that much empirical research is
necessarily based on observational data and that there are therefore "a host of problems in trying to
make credible causal inferences"); Jeffrey Fagan, Death and Deterrence Redux: Science, Law and
CausalReasoning on CapitalPunishment, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. (forthcoming 2007).
20. Carol S. Steiker, The Ethics and Empirics of CapitalPunishment: No, Capital Punishment
Is Not Morally Required: Deterrence,Deontology, and the Death Penalty, 58 STAN. L. REv. 751,
789 (2005) (responding to the claim of the "moral requirement" of Sunstein and Vermeule by
stating that "neither those who have categorical moral objections to the death penalty nor even those
who fully embrace consequentialism should be willing to make" the life-life tradeoff "that on closer
inspection reveals itself as the most Faustian of bargains").
21. Others find the results too unstable to be deemed reliable. See, e.g., Berk, supra note 19, at
328 (noting that the study data regarding deterrence is "highly skewed," with only small portions of
the data influencing the final results); Donohue & Wolfers, supra note 10, at 794 (finding that the
evidence supporting deterrence "cannot be reliably disentangled from the year-to-year changes in
the homicide rate").
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B. Errors in Aggregation
The question of whether the threat or actuality of execution adds to the
deterrent effect on homicide produced by lengthy imprisonment alone has
been the subject of statistical debate for more than a century. 2 The vast
majority of statistical studies that try to address this issue have used a variety
of punishment variables as independent variables (whether the death penalty
is authorized, or used, or its frequency)
and the total rate of intentional
23 as the dependent variable. 24
homicides
The use of total intentional homicide has always been an aggregation
error in the deterrence debate in the United States. a5 Under common law,
only the top grade of murder was ever eligible for the death penalty, but the
traditional legal framework of the criteria that made criminal homicide potentially capital was far from clear until the United States Supreme Court
imposed minimum constitutional standards for death eligibility in Gregg v.
Georgia26 and its companion 1976 cases.27 The Supreme Court required the
specific definition of murders that are death-eligible and the states responded
with a series of death eligibility standards (usually from section 210.6 of the
Model Penal Code).28
22. Ehrlich, supra note 4, at 397 (noting that debates over the "justness and efficacy of capital
punishment" have involved some kind of statistical analysis from the time of Beccaria in the
eighteenth century).
23. These studies most commonly compute the total rate of intentional homicides by using the
counts of murders and non-negligent homicides supplied by either local law enforcement agencies
or by the Department of Justice through the FBI's Uniform Crime Reporting Program. See, e.g.,
Liu, supra note 16, at 244 (employing intentional homicide data supplied by the Department of
Justice, which compiles Uniform Crime Reports with the information provided by local law
enforcement agencies); Shepherd, supra note 15, at 304 (same). For an assessment of the
Department of Justice data, see MICHAEL D. MALTZ, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, BRIDGING
GAPS
IN
POLICE
CRIME
DATA
1
(1999),
available
at
http://www.ojb.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/bgpcd.pdf.
24. See Hearing, supra note 13, at 12 (noting that modem studies of the deterrent effect of
capital punishment have used multivariate regression analysis, which separates the effects of
different factors on a set number of murders).
25. See THORSTEN SELLIN, THE DEATH PENALTY: A REPORT FOR THE MODEL PENAL CODE
PROJECT OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE 52-59 (1959) (testing execution effects by counting
separately particularly high-risk categories of homicides, such as killings of police officers and

prison guards).
26. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
27. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280
(1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
28. Under Gregg and its companion cases, this definition can occur in one of two ways. A state
may either narrowly define a class of death-eligible murders for a jury finding during the guiltinnocence phase of trial or a state may broadly define a class of death-eligible murders and provide
for the narrowing of the class by jury findings of aggravating factors during the sentencing phase of
trial. See Jurek, 428 U.S. at 276-77 (approving the Texas statute that embodies the narrow
definition alternative); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 206-07 (approving the Georgia statute that embodies the
broad definition alternative). For examples of the state statutes that were at issue at the time of
Gregg, see GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1 (Supp. 1974); TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071
(Vernon Supp. 1974-1975); and FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (1973 & Supp. 1975). The modern version
of the Georgia statute is codified at GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-5-1, 17-10-30, 17-10-31, 17-10-35

1808

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 84:1803

Yet most of the new deterrence studies have estimated the effects of
executions on total homicides.
This makes little sense, either
jurisprudentially or as a matter of behavioral science. Since Gregg, the
statutory description of death-eligible murders has been a constitutional requirement for state and federal criminal codes. State statutes recognize that
there are grades of willfulness or premeditation, and these will impact the
likelihood of a homicide resulting in the death penalty. 29 Similarly, there are

some homicides-such as killings of police or children-that evoke strong
normative responses from legislatures which in turn are expressed in
particular sections of capital statutes creating eligibility for the death penalty
for such crimes.30 Jurisprudentially, the idea that "death is different" has
guided states to craft death penalty statutes that reserve execution for offenders who not only meet capital eligibility requirements but whose
culpability
31
rises to a threshold that matches the severity of a death sentence.
Social science research on homicide also has distinguished among types
of murders and murderers.32 These studies suggest that the capacity for
(2005). The modem version of the Texas and Florida statutes can be found at the same citations as
above.
29. Hans Zeisel, The DeterrentEffect of the Death Penalty: Facts v. Faith, 1976 SUP. CT. REV.
317, 326.
30. For example, several states include killings of children below statutorily defined ages as an
aggravating circumstance that creates eligibility for capital punishment. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-703(F)(9) (2001); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1(b)(7) (2002); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 14:30(A)(5) (1997); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.033(10) (2005); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.01(C)
(West 1997); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 971 l(d)(16) (1998); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31(12) (2004).
31. Jeffrey Abramson, Death-is-Different Jurisprudence and the Role of the Capital Jury, 2
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 117passim (2004); see, e.g., Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 605-06 (2002)
("[T]here is no doubt that '[d]eath is different."') (alteration in original); id. at 614 (Breyer, J.,
concurring in the judgment) ("[T]he Eighth Amendment requires States to apply special procedural
safeguards when they seek the death penalty."); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 337 (2002)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the majority opinion holding it cruel and unusual to punish
persons with mental retardation with death is the "pinnacle of... death-is-different jurisprudence");
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 340 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("It hardly needs
reiteration that this Court has consistently acknowledged the uniqueness of the punishment of
death."); Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 463 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing "previously
unquestioned principle" that unique safeguards are necessary because death penalty is "qualitatively
different"); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 459 (1984) (citing the Court's prior recognition of
the "qualitative difference of the death penalty") (citation omitted); id. at 468 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[T]he death penalty is qualitatively different.., and
hence must be accompanied by unique safeguards ....); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604
(1978) (holding death to be "qualitatively different"); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,
305 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, & Stevens, JJ.) ("[T]he penalty of death is
qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment, however long."); Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 188 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, & Stevens, JJ.) ("[T]he penalty of death is
different in kind from any other punishment ....); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 286-89
(1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("Death is a unique punishment .. ");id. at 306 (Stewart, J.,
concurring) ("The penalty of death differs from all other forms of criminal punishment, not in
degree but in kind.").
32. See, e.g., JACK KATZ, THE SEDUCTIONS OF CRIME 32-34 (1988) (differentiating homicides
based on motivations for their commission); JAMES O'KANE, WICKED DEEDS: MURDER IN
AMERICA 19-34 (2005) (examining and explaining the differences between homicide, murder, and
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rational action among offenders often is doubtful, as they are prone to
hyperdiscounting of risk and inflation of the immediate value of their
actions.33 Accordingly, to lump all homicides into a singular category that
assumes that all murders are equally deterrable runs afoul of both law and
facts.
Despite these legal boundaries on which homicides are death-eligible,
nearly all studies have examined the effects of capital punishment on total
homicides. Only three studies have examined the effects of execution on an
index of murders that are eligible for the death penalty, and none have identified a deterrent effect on capital murders. Professor Robert H. Dann
examined capital homicides-those eligible for the death penalty-in
Philadelphia in the sixty days before and after each of five highly publicized
executions that took place between 1929 and 1932. 34 He found no evidence
of a change in capital homicide rates, nor in other homicide rates. Professor
Leonard Savitz replicated Dann's research design for the period 1944-1947,
examining capital-eligible homicides in the eight weeks before and after four
highly publicized death sentences. 35 Like Dann, Savitz found no evidence of
deterrence.3 6
More recently, Professors Ruth Peterson and William Bailey analyzed
the effects of executions on rates of "felony murder," defined as killings
committed in the course of six specific felony crimes: rape, robbery,
burglary, larceny, vehicle theft, and arson.3 7 They added another composite
category that included murders committed in the course of nonfelony crimes
including prostitution, narcotics violations, gambling, and a wide range of
other felonies. 38 Using time-series analyses, they found no deterrent effects
of executions on felony murders. 39 This was an improvement over earlier
tests that lumped together capital and other homicides. After all, felony
murder carries strict liability, a consequence of the intent-based retributivism
that guides most of the capital murder statutes in effect in thirty-eight states

manslaughter); KENNETH POLK, WHEN MEN KILL: SCENARIOS OF MASCULINE VIOLENCE 175-84

(1994) (distinguishing homicides based on relationships between victim and offender); MARVIN
WOLFGANG, PATTERNS IN CRIMINAL HOMICIDE 20-27 (1958) (same).

33. See, e.g, Francisco Parisi & Vernon Smith, Introduction to THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF
IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR 1, 1-2 (Francisco Parisi & Vernon Smith eds., 2005) (arguing that doubts
over human rationality arise from people's varying degrees of "skills, endowments, and a variety of
psychological and physical constraints"); see also infra notes 159-160 and accompanying text.
34. Robert H. Dann, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment, FRIENDS' SOC. SERVICE
SERIES, Mar. 1935, at3, 5-6.
35. Leonard D. Savitz, A Study of Capital Punishment, 49 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POL.
SCI. 338, 340 (1958).
36. Id. at 341.
37. Ruth D. Peterson & William C. Bailey, Felony Murder and Capital Punishment: An
Examinationof the Deterrence Question, 29 CRIMINOLOGY 367, 372 (1991).

38. Id.
39. Id. at 379-80.
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today.40 However, this narrowing exercise produced no evidence of a deterrent effect, using homicide data from 1976 to 1987.
The most recent effort to disaggregate homicides was published by
Professor Joanna Shepherd,4 ' who used information about homicide
circumstances and situations that is provided in police descriptions of
homicides and made available through a public-use data archive.42 Shepherd
reported that executions deter all types of murder, including "crimes of
passion" that so often are considered to be irrational and spontaneous acts
that are beyond the rational reach of execution threats.43 However,
Shepherd's partitioning of the data was not indexed to statute, but to a set of
categories descriptive of "different types of murders ' 4 that were defined neither by statute nor, with the exception of "crimes of passion," by theory.
More important, none of these categories was narrowed according to statutory criteria that bound the circumstances and conditions that qualify a
murder as "capital. '45
With this one exception, the majority of the current portfolio of
deterrence studies, conducted principally by economists, have ignored these
limited attempts to isolate the effects of capital punishment on the crimes to
which it is targeted, and instead assume that the threat of execution will deter
all manner of homicides. In this Article, we set out to correct this error.
C. The Research Enterprise
We shift the argument on deterrence by focusing not on general
homicide trends and rates, but on the subset of homicides that have been
defined as eligible for the death penalty by statute. These types of homicides
should provide a more sensitive indicator than the overall homicide rate index for detecting a deterrent effect from execution. 46 We use the public-use

40. Kevin Cole, Killings During Crimes: Toward a DiscriminatingTheory of Strict Liability, 28
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 73, 74-75 & n.6 (1990).
41. Shepherd, supra note 15, at 285.
42. Id. Information about the circumstances of events is provided by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation in the Supplementary Homicide Reports, a data file of homicide records that includes
information on victims, offenders (where known via arrest), and the circumstances of the homicide
event. See MALTZ, supra note 23, at 31-39; see also infra note 72.
43. Shepherd, supra note 15, at 308.
44. Id. at 292 (discussing murders of intimates, acquaintances, and strangers, as well as crimeof-passion murders, murders committed during felonies, and murders of African Americans and

whites).
45. Id. For a discussion of the aggravating and mitigating factors that a jury takes into account
in the penalty phase of a capital murder case, see 40A AM. JUR. 2D HOMICIDE § 551 (1999).
46. See, e.g., Franklin Zimring & Gordon Hawkins, Deterrence and MarginalGroups, 5 J. RES.

CRIME & DELINQ. 100, 100-05 (1968) (advocating "marginal group" analysis, which aims to
identify the persons whom deterrent measures are thought to control and to provide a more precise
account of the deterrent effect of criminal laws). Some might consider this distinction nothing more
than an "acoustic separation" that has little meaning in the reality of homicide commission. But as
we show later on, the breadth and heterogeneity of homicide make this distinction meaningful.
Moreover, one might argue that if there is no special deterrent effect for "capital homicides," then
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data archive based on police descriptions of homicides from 1976-2003 to
construct rates of potentially death-eligible killings. While death-eligible
cases are a much larger fraction of total homicides than cases that produce
death sentences, the types of killing that are eligible for the capital sanction
are less than 25% of total criminal homicides, as will be seen in Table 1 and
Figure 1.
Once potentially capital killings have been isolated, our research
strategy is to probe for distinctive movements in death-eligible killings in
death penalty states to show whether the prospect of execution is influencing
homicide, rather than the many other factors that vary over time to produce
fluctuations in homicide rates. The study uses the variation in nondeatheligible killings as a natural control for temporal influences. We hypothesize
that variations in the administration of the death penalty should produce
increases and decreases in death-eligible killings that are distinct from
changes in nondeath-eligible killings-such specific patterns are the
distinctive fingerprint of the death penalty effect.
This strategy was first used in a study of "three strikes and you're out"
laws which greatly increased the penalties for two classes of persons with
prior records who had previously been responsible for about one-eighth of
California felony arrests.47 The test of deterrent impact in that study was to
see if the proportionate share of persons in the two special penalty categories
declined after the effective date of the new legislation.4 8 The study found
that the proportion of defendants eligible for third strikes in the post-law arrest pool declined 19% (indicating marginal deterrence) but that the
proportion of second strike eligible defendants did not change (indicating no
additional deterrence for this group).4 9
In the current study, any increase in execution risk should reduce the
proportion of killings that are potentially death-eligible if it is the change in
death risk that is operating net of other factors that may be influencing rates
of both capital-eligible and other homicides. It is only for capital-eligible

the threat of death could just as easily affect not only homicide but all nonlethal crimes. We
constrain the analysis to the types of homicides most likely to produce death-eligible cases by
controlling for robberies, the paradigm of a felony murder. See infra note 56 and accompanying
text. We also conduct robustness tests by estimating the effects of death sentences and executions
on felony murders, those murders committed during the course of commission of another homicide.
See infra Part IV.
47. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING ET AL.,

PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY: THREE STRIKES AND

YOU'RE OUT IN CALIFORNIA 85 (2001) [hereinafter ZIMRING ET AL., THREE STRIKES]; see also
FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING ET AL., CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN CALIFORNIA: THE IMPACT OF THREE
STRIKES AND YOU'RE OUT 1-2 (2001) [hereinafter ZIMRING ET AL., IMPACT OF THREE STRIKES].
48. ZIMRING ET AL., THREE STRIKES, supra note 47, at 85.

49. See id. at 98 (noting that the proportion of third strike offenders dropped from 4.3% to 3.5%
after the passage of the law while there was no significant change in the proportion of second strike
offenders for the same time period).
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killings that the threat has any reality.50 If the risk of execution goes down,
then the proportion of death-eligible killings in death penalty states should
increase because the force of the death threat has weakened. The shorthand

method for measuring these specific effects is to determine the "market
share" of cases that would be death-eligible both over time and between

states at various time points.
There are three different "market share"

comparisons that test

deterrence. In death penalty states, the market share of death-eligible cases
should go down when execution risk increases and should go up when exe-

cution risk decreases. Cross-sectionally, the market share of death-eligible
cases should be larger in states without a death penalty (no marginal deter-

rent of capital threat) than in states with a death penalty. And as execution
risk increases, the market share of death-eligible cases should shrink in death
penalty states but not in states without the death penalty. In sum, the comparison of death-eligible versus non-eligible homicides becomes the
preferred method of choosing between execution effects and other temporal

factors.
We begin with an analysis of the market share of capital homicides in
the context of homicide trends from 1976 to 2003 in all death penalty states
and compare patterns in those states with nondeath penalty jurisdictions.
Then, we add a detailed analysis of trends in the state of Texas and in
Houston, its largest city. We place special emphasis on Texas (and Houston)

for two reasons. That state and that city have been the dominant users of
executions in the modem era, with Texas accounting for more than one-third
of all executions in the first quarter century after executions resumed
(through 2006).51 The second reason for a special Texas focus is that recent

50. See Shepherd, supra note 15, at 292. Shepherd maintains that executions deter all types of
murder by allowing all would-be murderers to update their expectations of punishment risk,
compensating for the uncertainty about whether the murder they are about to commit would be
charged and prosecuted capitally. Id. Such uncertainty, she claims, has less to do with the putative
murder than with exogenous factors such as prosecutorial discretion, quality of defense counsel, and
juror preferences. Id. These assumptions of cognition, risk analysis, cost measuring, and
premeditation in homicide are rarely observed in research on murder and murderers, except perhaps
among the very small percentage of murder-for-hire and premeditated killings. See Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 186 (1976) ("There are carefully contemplated murders, such as murder for
hire, where the possible penalty of death may well enter into the cold calculus that precedes the
decision to act."). Rather, murderers are more likely to discount punishment risks and inflate the
present value of whatever gains the crime may offer. See Yair Listokin, Efficient Time Bars: A New
Rationalefor the Existence of Statutes ofLimitations in CriminalLaw, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 99, 100
(2002) (noting as "commonly accepted within ... criminology" the view that "criminals discount
the future at a higher rate than society"). Recognizing this, state legislatures have historically
enacted murder laws that focus on intent as a metric to identify and isolate a set of murders for the
most serious punishments available in that state. See Cole, supra note 40, at 74 (stating that a
killing will be classified as a criminal homicide only if the killer possessed a certain mental state).
51. Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Executions in the United States, 1608-1976, By State,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=8&did=l 10. The Death Penalty Information
Center's website displays a number of statistical tables about the death penalty, which are
periodically updated to take account of new death sentences, executions, and exonerations. This
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social science analysis of general homicide patterns has shown that the
evidence of execution impact on total homicide can be dismissed for U.S.
death states other than Texas.5 2 Indeed, much of the deterrent effect observed in the new deterrence studies is leveraged by the influence of Texas,
and within Texas, the effects are concentrated in and leveraged by the patterns in Harris County. 53 If executions show a distinctive impact on deatheligible killings anywhere, Texas should be the place. Given the high rate of
executions in Texas, the case for the impact of the death penalty on capitaleligible homicide over time cannot be so easily dismissed for Texas.
Finally, we use panel data methods to estimate a series of regression
models to identify the effects of capital punishment on the rate of capitaleligible homicides. We adjust the estimates for the level of noncapital
homicides in each state over time to control for variations from state to state
in the base rates of homicide. This strategy allows us to estimate whether the
changes in the noncapital homicide rate are simultaneously influencing the
rate of capital homicides. We include two measures of capital punishment:
the existence of a death penalty statute in each state for each year in the panel
and then the number of death sentences and executions that took place in the
state in the preceding year and the preceding two years. We scale both the
number of capital-eligible homicides and other homicides to each state's
population to ensure that any deterrent effects from execution are weighted
proportionately to the state's population. We include a rich set of
socioeconomic and criminal justice system variables that are robust
correlates of the murder rate within and between states over time; these correlates and predictors of homicide have been validated extensively in
research across cities and states over the past three decades. 54 We are
particularly interested in the effects of incarceration rates in assessing
whether punishment risks compete with other social and legal factors,
Article's citations to the DPIC reflect the statistics on its webpage as of July 17, 2006, and archived
copies of those statistics as of that date are on file with the Texas Law Review.
52. See Berk, supra note 19, at 320-24 (proving that the deterrent effect of executions
disappears when Texas execution statistics are eliminated from statistical observations).
53. See id. at 328 (concluding that the inclusion of "Texas data can give the false impression
that a deterrence relationship exists" and "distributional problems that characterize the number of
executions remain when counties are the spatial units").
54. See Lauren J. Krivo & Ruth D. Peterson, The Structural Context of Homicide: Accounting
for Racial Differences in Process, 65 AM. SOC. REV. 547, 558 (2000) (finding that "crimegenerating processes" are correlated with structural and socioeconomic variables and not necessarily
with race); Kenneth C. Land et al., Structural Covariates of Homicides Rates: Are There Any
Invariances Across Time and Social Space?, 95 AM. J. SOC. 922, 951 (1990) ("By far, the strongest
and most invariant effect is due to the resource-deprivation/affluence index; consistently across the
four decennial census periods, cities, metropolitan areas, or states that are more deprived have
higher homicide rates, and those that are more affluent have lower rates."); Robert J. Sampson &
Janet L. Lauritsen, Violent Victimization and Offending: Individual-, Situational-, and CommunityLevel Risk Factors,in 3 UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTING VIOLENCE: SOCIAL INFLUENCES 1, 48

(Albert J. Reiss, Jr. & Jeffrey A. Roth eds., 1994) ("Not surprisingly, a large proportion of recent
neighborhood-based studies of violence have emphasized dimensions of poverty and economic

inequality.").
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including capital punishment, in predicting changes in homicide rates over
time.55 We include an index for the robbery rate to control for the supply of
events that produce a large share of capital-eligible homicides. 56 We use
alternate analytic methods that consider time trends in different ways,
including procedures that account for the strong autocorrelation or
stationarity of homicide rates over time.
II.

Capital Homicides

A.

The Rules and Grammar of CapitalMurder
One of Furman's legacies is the development within death penalty
states of statutory language defining which homicides are eligible for capital
punishment. As Professors Jonathan Simon and Christina Spaulding
comment, these elements of homicides provide a "currency through which
states seek to recognize various concerns and valorize certain kinds of subjects and situations. ' '57 Designed to eliminate the arbitrariness in death
sentencing that underscored death penalty statutes and prosecutorial practices
before Furman, the new statutes were designed to tighten and rationalize the
justification for the execution of certain murderers and the exemption of others from death. The elements that informed most states were derived from
the Model Penal Code 58 factors plus a few additional factors that legislators
included at the time that each state drafted its initial post-Furman law. 9
Simon and Spaulding characterize the ritual addition each year of new
aggravating factors to capital statutes as akin to state legislatures "hanging
Christmas ornaments. 6 °
Simon and Spaulding list fourteen aggravating factors that characterize
capital statutes in the post-Gregg era, including the eight in the Model Penal
Code plus six others that are common to the current era of death penalty
legislation.61 Some of these aggravators list special victims based on their
55. See, e.g., Katz et al., supra note 10, at 339-40 (reporting a negative correlation between
prison death rates-a proxy for poor prison conditions-and crime rates, but finding little deterrent
effect of capital punishment); see also Steven D. Levitt, Understanding Why Crime Fell in the
1990s: Four Factorsthat Explain the Decline and Six that Do Not, J. ECON. PERSP., winter 2004, at
163, 170-83 (finding four factors that explain the nationwide decrease in crime: the increased
number of police, the rising prison population, the receding crack cocaine epidemic, and the

legalization of abortion).
56. See infra text accompanying note 86 (indicating that 80% of forcible felony killings are
robbery-homicides).
57. Jonathan Simon & Christina Spaulding, Tokens of Our Esteem: Aggravating Factors in the

Era of Deregulated Death Penalties, in THE KILLING STATE: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN LAW,
POLITICS, AND CULTURE 81, 81 (Austin Sarat ed., 1999).
58. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 cmt. 12 (Revised Commentary 1980).
59. See id. at cmt. 13 (discussing the addition of "the knowing killing of a police officer,
fireman, or prison" officer as an aggravating factor as the "most common departure" from the
Model Penal Code by state legislatures).
60. Simon & Spaulding, supra note 57, at 82.
61. See id. at 84 tbl.4.1.

2006]

Capital Punishment and Capital Murder

1815

vulnerability: the very young and the very old.62 Still others mention killings
committed by persons serving prison sentences, multiple-victim shootings,
killings committed in the course of crimes for monetary gain, crimes committed while fleeing a lawful arrest, and killings of police officers,
correctional staff, or public officials.63 Between 1972 and 1980, nearly all
death penalty states adopted the eight aggravating factors from the Model
Penal Code, and then added a core of other factors that today are commonly
used in death penalty statutes: heinousness or atrociousness of the act, murders committed while lying in wait, and killings of witnesses in criminal or
civil proceedings. 64 In a second wave of legislation, following the sharp rise
in homicides nationally, legislatures added another set of aggravating factors
by expanding their felony murder laws.65 These statutes listed special
circumstances, such as drug deals, gang drive-by shootings, and murders or
other crimes committed with automatic weapons. For over a decade beginning in the 1980s, these crimes captured the popular imagination and
animated the political rhetoric and legislative response to the nation's
worsening crime problems.66
These laws on the books provide one component of the logic that we
used to define capital-eligible homicides. The contrasting component was
the law in action. Beyond the current debate on proportionality is a larger
question about who exactly is on death row, and the extent to which these
persons are a mirror of the selection processes that create pools of deatheligible defendants from among persons arrested for murder. And until
recently, there has been almost no systematic research on the types of
aggravating factors that create death eligibility among persons either selected
for capital prosecution or sentenced to death by judges or juries.6 7

62. See id. at 91 tbl.4.2.

63. Id.
64. Id. at 84.
65. Seeid. at91 tbl.4.2.
66. See, e.g., 48 Hours on Crack Street (CBS television broadcast Feb. 19, 1988); see also
WILLIAM J. BENNETT ET AL., BODY COUNT: MORAL POVERTY... AND HOW TO WIN AMERICA'S

WAR AGAINST CRIME AND DRUGS 14 (1996) (advancing a prediction of a generation of
"superpredators" who would kill wantonly and randomly and whose crimes would demand
punishment by death).
67. One effort to identify which cases among the statutorily capital-eligible were selected for
prosecution was recently completed in Maryland. See Raymond Paternoster et al., Justice by
Geography and Race: The Administration of the Death Penalty in Maryland, 1978-99, 4 U. MD.
L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 1, 17 (2004). Examining 1,311 death-eligible cases from
1978 to 1999 based on the Maryland statute, MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-303 (LexisNexis
2002), Paternoster and his colleagues identified a set of cases that were death-eligible and where
capital charges were filed. Maryland's statute includes a total of fourteen aggravating factors that
qualify a case as death-eligible. Id. The factors that were most common among the death-eligible
cases are similar to the list compiled by Simon and Spaulding, though with some minor differences.
See Paternoster et al., supra, at 59 tbl. 1. Although the Maryland study addressed racial disparity, it
generated statistical information on which statutory aggravating factors were most often present
among cases selected for capital prosecution: murders committed during other crimes, murders with
multiple victims, murders committed while the perpetrator was in a correctional institution, contract
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We turned to Texas as an example of a law in action that produces a
large set of capital cases. As most observers of the death penalty know,
Texas's total of 369 post-Gregg executions is the highest in the United
States, accounting for more than one execution in three since 1976, and
nearly four times more than the 95 executions in Virginia, the next most frequent execution state. 68 Texas's murder statute lists nine aggravating factors
that create eligibility for the death penalty. 69 These factors are similar to the
Model Penal Code aggravating factors, but are somewhat narrower than the
longer list of aggravators common in the states today. 70 Evidently, both in its
categorical structure and its implementation, the Texas statute is sufficiently
broad and flexible--elastic, in effect-as to generate a large number of
capital-eligible homicides. The combination of the high rate of executions in
Texas, the state's prominent role in the new deterrence literature, and its
statutory framework provide an ideal setting to identify a set of capitaleligible cases and to test whether execution has a deterrent effect on that
subset of cases. Accordingly, we adopted and operationalized the Texas
statute as a second framework to identify a set of capital-eligible cases from
across both death penalty states and nondeath penalty states in the postGregg era.
B. Applying the Rules
To identify which homicides were capital-eligible, we turned to the
Supplementary Homicide Reports, a data archive created and maintained by
the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Known as the SHRs, these case-level records are created by participating police departments across the country and compiled by the FBI. 71 Data are
available from 1976 to 2003, and include records of 494,729 homicide
cases. 72 The SHR has the unique advantage of providing detailed, case-level
information about the context and circumstances of each homicide event
known to the police.73 This allows us to identify the presence of factors that
map onto the statutory framework of the Texas murder statutes and more
broadly onto the Model Penal Code aggravating factors.
killings, and murders committed while fleeing capture by police. Id. The Maryland study was
designed to identify racial disparity, so the odds ratio associated with each of the statutory factors
was not computed.
68. Death Penalty Info. Ctr., supra note 51.
69. TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 19.03 (Vernon 2006).
70. See Simon & Spaulding, supra note 57, app. 4A at 102-09 (listing aggravating factors by
jurisdiction).
71. Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Homicide Trends in the U.S.,
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/homicide/homtmd.htm#contents. The source data are published as
Uniform Crime Reports [United States]: Supplementary Homicide Reports, 1976-2003 (ICPSR
Study
No.
4351,
2005)
[hereinafter
SHR],
available
at
http://webapp.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/ICPSR-STUDY/04351 .xml.
72. SHR, supra note 71.
73. Id.
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Much has been written about the Supplementary Homicide Reports, and
the limitations of the archive are well known. 4 Nonreporting by some law
enforcement agencies is probably the most significant concern, and efforts to
overcome this limitation have generated the most attention among
researchers.7 5 Much of this attention has focused on developing ways to
revise population estimates of the demographic distribution of homicide victims and offenders within specific years.76 But for our purposes, missing
data is a less serious limitation, because we have no reason to suspect that the
ratio of capital-eligible to other homicides varies systematically in years
when SHR observations are missing. 77 Our concern is with the observed patterns of circumstances and situations, and there is no theoretical or empirical
reason to suspect that any particular circumstance, especially felony murder,
would be more or less prevalent in those states where police agencies have
failed to compile these records.
To generate estimates of the prevalence of capital homicides, we coded
each homicide record in the SHR as a capital-eligible homicide if the
circumstances included any of the following elements that are part of the
recurrent language of capital-eligible homicides across the states: (a) killings
during the commission of robbery, burglary, rape or sexual assault, arson,
and kidnapping; (b) killings of children below age six; 78 (c) multiple-victim
killings; (d) "gangland" killings involving organized crime or street gangs;
(e) "institution" killings where the offender was confined in a correctional or
other governmental institution; (f) sniper killings; and (g) killings in the
course of drug business. We excluded killings by persons below age sixteen,
whose eligibility for the death penalty was removed by the United States

74. See, e.g., MALTZ, supra note 23, at 33-39.
75. See, e.g., Robert L. Flewelling, A NonparametricImputation Approach for Dealing With
Missing Variablesin SHR Data, 8 HOMICIDE STuD. 255 (2004) (discussing the nature and extent of
the non-reporting problem and exploring possible solutions); James Alan Fox, Missing Data
Problems in the SHR: Imputing Offender and Relationship Characteristics,8 HOMICIDE STUD. 214
(2004) (same).
76. E.g., Flewelling, supra note 75 (developing an imputation method to adjust demographic
estimates for victims and offenders to more accurately reflect actual populations); Fox, supra note
75 (same).
77. See Betsey Stevenson & Justin Wolfers, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: Divorce
Laws and Family Distress, 121 Q.J. ECON 267, 275 n. 15 (2006) (estimating that nonparticipation in
the SHR produced 37 of 2,754 state-year observations for the period 1964-1996 where missing data
required interpolation to estimate gender-specific homicide rates).
78. We included killings of children that are found in the death statutes of states with high death
sentencing or execution rates (Texas, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Alabama), but are not
present in several other states with populous death rows or high execution counts (California,
Florida, and Georgia). To illustrate, the following states include child killings in their capital
statutes: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703 (F)(9) (2001 & Supp. 2005); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
5/9-1(b)(7) (West 2002 & Supp. 2005); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:30(A)(5) (1997 & Supp. 2006);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.033(10) (2005); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.01(C) (West 1997); 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 971 l(d)(16) (West 1998 & Supp. 2005); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31(12) (2004).
Several other states do not mention child killings. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West 2006);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04 (West 2000 & Supp. 2006); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30 (2004).
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Supreme Court in Thompson v. Oklahoma in 1988. 79 The ban was extended
in 2005 to all persons below the age of 18 in Roper v Simmons.80 We also
included a separate count of the killings of police officers. The annual data
files, Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted (LEOKA) also are
compiled by the U.S. Department of Justice through the FBI. 81 A separate
count for this prominent category of capital-eligible homicides was needed
because the SHR data do not permit classification of this group of homicides.
These totals were compiled for both death penalty and nondeath penalty
states from 1976 to 2003.82 Figure 1 and Table 1 show the types of killings
and their relative frequency.

79. 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988). For a review of the jurisprudence on immaturity and the
diminished culpability of adolescents in capital trials, see Jeffrey Fagan, Atkins, Adolescence, and
the Maturity Heuristic: Rationales for a Categorical Exemption for Juveniles from Capital
Punishment, 33 N.M. L. REv. 207, 234-52 (2003), which discusses evidence of juveniles'
immaturity, the risk of false confessions, and the risk of error in attempts to assess individual
juveniles' culpability, and Victor L. Streib, ProsecutorialDiscretion in Juvenile Homicide Cases,
109 PENN ST.L. REv. 1071, 1085 (2005), which discusses the importance of limiting the scope of
prosecutorial discretion in juvenile homicide cases due to the special circumstances in these cases.
80. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
81. LEOKA compiles data from the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports to create a data archive on
law enforcement officers killed in the line of duty. In addition to maintaining a machine-readable
data file, an annual report is published by the FBI. See, e.g., Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Law
Enforcement
Officers
Killed
and
Assaulted
2004,
http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/killed/2004/openpage.htm.
82. Each state was classified in each year as a death penalty or nondeath penalty state according
to the presence of a valid death penalty statute in that year.
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Table 1: Capital-eligible homicides, all states

Capital-eligible homicides by category
% of capitaleligible
homicides

% of all
N

Category
Homicides during crimes

59,459

11.8

48.2

Institution killings

816

0.2

0.7

Gangland killings

2,138

0.4

1.7

14,298

2.8

11.6

489

0.1

0.4

17,187

3.4

13.9

1,410

0.3

Youth gang killings
Sniper killings
Murders of children 6 and younger
Killings of police officers
Multiple victims

1.1

39,168

7.8

31.7

Total capital-eligible

123,485

24.5

100.0

Total noncapital-eligible

380,990

75.5

Total

504,475

100.0

Capital-eligible homicides during crimes by crime type
Category
Robbery

% of all
homicides

N

% of capitaleligible
homicides

46,861

9.3

37.9

Rape

3,732

0.7

3.0

Burglary

4,940

1.0

4.0

Arson

3,926

0.8

3.2

Total

59,459

11.8

48.2

83. SHR, supra note 71. For the LEOKA data, see Appendix B. The Supplementary Homicide
Reports are filtered to exclude the deaths in New York associated with the attacks of September 11,
2001, but include those associated with the Oklahoma City bombing of April 19, 1995.
Capital-eligible homicides are limited to those committed by offenders ages 16 or above and
those with unknown offender ages. Homicides committed by offenders younger than 16 are not
considered capital-eligible. (It is likely that some of the "unknown offender" homicides were also
committed by offenders under 16). Overall, 2.6% of homicides with offenders of known age were
committed by juveniles. Whether homicides with offenders of unknown ages are similarly
distributed is uncertain.
Total capital-eligible homicides is less than the sum of the individual categories, due to overlaps
in the categories. For example, among homicides not committed by juveniles, 6,798 committed in
the course of other crimes also had multiple victims; and, 880 homicides committed in the course of
other crimes also had child victims. Also, killings of police officers was added in separately since
these cases were not identifiable in the SHR records.
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Figure 1: Murder and non-negligent homicide: Potentially death-eligible and
other killings, 1976-2O0384

Potentially death-eligible

84. See supra note 83.

Not death-eligible
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Table 2: Capital-eligible homicides, Texas, 1977-200385
Capital-eligible homicides by category
Category
Homicides during crimes

% of capital-'
eligible
homicides

% of all

N
5,723

11.6

54.6

Institution killings

117

0.2

1.1

Gangland killings

259

0.5

2.5

Youth gang killings

155

0.3

1.5

18
1,520

0.0
3.1

0.2
14.5

Sniper killings
Murders of children 6 and younger
Killings of police officers

148

0.3

1.4

3,725

7.5

35.6

Total capital-eligible

10,476

21.1

100.0

Total noncapital-eligible

39,060

78.9

Total

49,536

100.0

Multiple victims

Capital-eligible homicides during crimes by crime type
Category
Robbery

% of capitaleligible
homicides

%of all

N
4,583

9.3

43.7

Rape

354

0.7

3.4

Burglary

606

1.2

5.8

Arson
Total

180

0.4

1.7

5,723

11.6

54.6

Across all states, a total of 24.5% of all reported killings were
potentially death-eligible types of cases, with the lion's share of these being
forcible felony killings (11.8%) and killings with multiple victims (7.8%).86
A small number of capital-eligible homicides were killings of children
(3.4%).
Among the forcible felony killings, nearly eight in ten
(46,861/59,459, or 78.8%) were robbery killings.

85. See supra note 83.
86. We excluded from the probable capital cases FBI-classified drug cases (4.3%) and autotheft killings (0.7%) noted by police. The drug category includes some cases that may be deatheligible under federal law and the auto cases that involve robberies would also count as robberies.
For state criminal law purposes, these cases are not death eligible without forcible felony
involvement. See generally Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Crimes Punishable by the Death Penalty,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=144&scid=10 (listing crimes punishable by death
state-by-state).
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There were small and statistically insignificant differences in these
distributions for death penalty and nondeath penalty states. In death penalty
states, felony killings comprised 11.6% of all homicides, multiple-victim
homicides were 7.7%, and homicides with child victims were 3.3%. In nondeath penalty states, felony killings were 12.5% of all homicides, multiplevictim homicides were 8.0%, and homicides with child victims were 3.6%.87
We repeated this analysis for homicides in Texas during the same
period. The portion of homicides in Texas in this period that were
potentially capital-eligible cases was slightly lower than the rate reported in
Table 1: 21.1%. Most of these were forcible felony killings (11.6%) and
killings with multiple victims (7.5%). As in the national estimate, a small
number of capital-eligible homicides were killings of children (3.1%).
Among the felony murders, the plurality again were robbery-homicides
(43.7%, or 80% of all felony murders).
There are two major problems with trying to measure the extent of
additional deterrence from a capital threat by study of variation in a crime
category where three-fourths of the offenses are not eligible for death. First,
if there is any marginal deterrence from variations in execution risk,
including so many cases where there was no risk of execution might dilute
the apparent deterrence from those cases where the risk of execution was
real. Any deterrent threat should be clustered in death-eligible cases, so including masses of ineligible cases reduces the apparent impact of the threat.
Why not simply test the impact of execution risk on some aggregate crime
category, like index crime as a whole or on all violent felonies? A fair test of
deterrence should restrict the presumed dependent variable to those cases
where the law intends to threaten death-on the 25% of cases where death is
a possibility and not on the 75% of cases where it is not. The inclusion of so
many cases where death is not a threatened sanction also risks falsely concluding that changes over time in homicide rates are caused by variations in
threatened or administered rates of execution. The inclusion of all homicides
assumes that the deterrent effect of execution is highly inelastic across a very
heterogeneous set of circumstances and individuals of varying capacities.
Adding in so many noncapital cases risks creating an ocean of artificial
deterrence.
1. Testing the Accuracy of the Classifications.-The number and
variety of death-eligible cases in Figure 1 and Table 1 were derived from the
Supplementary Homicide Reports (SHR), an archive produced by the FBI as
part of its Uniform Crime Report series. The SHR archive provides information about the circumstances in the majority of death-eligible killings, but
not in all categories of death-eligible killings that are identified in the

87. Data are available from the authors at http://www2.law.columbia.edu/fagan/researchdata/
caphom/.
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majority of state statutes. For example, the SHR records provide sufficient
information to identify homicides committed during the commission of other
crimes (felony murders), institution killings, multiple-victim killings, sniper
killings, and killings of very young children or the very old. But the SHR
records do not provide information to identify cases of murder-for-hire, some
of the murders that are capital-eligible because of the heinous or atrocious
nature of the act, or murders of police officers.
To test the accuracy and comprehensiveness of the SHR categories that
we used to segregate killings that carry a risk of a capital sentence, we
identified the 100 most recent consecutive executions reported in U.S. court
records as of March 1, 2006, listed in the execution database maintained by
the Death Penalty Information Center (DPIC).8 8 The DPIC database has the
capacity to generate lists of executions according to user-selected identifiers
such as state, defendant characteristics, and time period. To estimate the
coverage of the SHR records among the universe of executed persons, we
identified the 100 most recent executions and then obtained court records that
stated the circumstances of the murder for which the defendants were executed. We then coded these cases to determine the specific statutory
aggravators that these cases reflected. This procedure generated an index of
the proportion of actual executions which were identified as death-eligible in
our classification system.
The sample of executions covers the period from June 8, 2004 to
February 15, 2006, beginning with William Zuern in the state of Ohio and
concluding with Clyde Smith Jr. in Texas. In our analysis, all but five of the
100 cases would appear as death-eligible based on our definition. The exceptions were three homicides that we classified as "contract killings" or
"murder-for-hire," and two characterized by the court and classified by us as
''exceptional cruelty" ("atrocious" or "heinous").
These results validate the accuracy of the classification system that we
used to identify capital-eligible homicides. Extrapolating this 95% accuracy,
we estimate that the true proportion of death-eligible cases is 25% of total
killings, and that 95% of these are in our death-eligible class. We also estimate that the proportion of cases misclassified as not death-eligible is five for
every 300 cases classified as nondeath-eligible (the ratio of non-eligible to
eligible is greater than three to 1). That is, we estimate that 1.67% of the
group that we classified as nondeath-eligible is likely to be death-eligible.
The cases in our death-eligible category are about 60 times more likely to
end up with death sentences as cases in the non-eligible category.
We also checked the extent to which our categories of potentially deatheligible killing in Texas covered cases that generated actual executions. We
examined the most recent fifty cases that led to executions in Texas as of

88. Death
Penalty
Info.
Ctr.,
Searchable
Database
of
Executions,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions.php [hereinafter DPIC, Searchable Database].
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May 10, 2006, beginning with Kenneth Bruce on January 14, 2004, and
ending with Jackie Wilson on May 4, 2006.89 All but two of these fifty cases
fit exactly our statutory criteria and definition. The two that were not included in our definition were "contract killings," an aggravating factor that is
frequently unknown when a case is listed by local police agencies when
compiling their SHR reports. Accordingly, we estimate the definition of
capital-eligible homicides in this study captures 96% of all Texas homicides
that result in death sentences and executions, a figure comparable to the 95%
accuracy estimate for all the death penalty states.
C. Execution and the Market Share of CapitalHomicides
The study of trends in only death-eligible cases should solve both of the
problems associated with aggregating capital and noncapital killings. If execution risk is driving homicide levels, then this should be a specific effect
observed in death-eligible cases but not in other types of homicide. If,
however, temporal influences independent of the death penalty are producing
false inferences about deterrence, then we would expect to see similar trends
in capital and noncapital-eligible homicides. That is why what we call the
"market share" of death-eligible homicides is critical to our study.
Figures 2a-2c show the trends for the nation, and then separately for
death penalty and nondeath penalty states. Recall that a state is a death penalty state in any year only if there was a valid death penalty statute in effect
in that state during that specific year. To frame these trends, note that executions were a relatively rare event in the United States before 1984: executions rose from 5 nationally in 1983 to 21 in 1984, declined to 11 in 1988,
and then rose steadily for over a decade-peaking in 1999 with 98
executions nationally before declining again to 59 in 2004.90

89. Id.
90. Death
Penalty
Info.
Ctr.,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=8&did=146.

Executions
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Year,
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Figure 2a: Capital and noncapital homicide rate per 1QO,000 persons and
percent capital, all states, 1976-200391

Figure 2b: Capital and noncapital homicide rate per 100,000 persons and
percent capital, death penalty states, 1976-200392

1975

1980
-O-Captl MurderRate

91. See SHR, supra note 71.
92. See id.

1985

1990

1995

,-Non-CapitalMurderRate

2000

2005

-*=% Capital ( 9M da)ft)

Texas Law Review

1826

[Vol. 84:1803

Figure 2c: Capital and noncapital homicide rate per 100,000 persons and
percent capital, nondeath penalty states, 1976-2003"3
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Figure 2a shows the national trend for all states from 1976 to 2003. The
index of capital-eligible murders varies within a narrow range over nearly
three decades, from a low of 1 per 100,000 persons in 2000 to a high of 2 per
100,000 persons in 1993. The long-term trend in noncapital murders shows a
large decline over the same period, with a decline of nearly 50% from 1980
to 2000. Most important for our analysis is the long-term rise in the market
share of homicides that are capital-eligible. The market share rises from a
low of approximately 22% in 1975 to a peak of nearly 28% in 1995, and then
varies by one percent each year above or below the 28% level through 2003.
This pattern also is evident in death penalty states. Figure 2b shows the
same roller coaster pattern of capital-eligible homicides and a similar secular
decline of more than 50% in noncapital homicides. The market share of
capital-eligible crimes rises substantially in the death penalty states, from
approximately 18% in 1975 to 27% in 1995. The market share fluctuates in a
narrow range for the next nine years before returning to its previous high in
2004. The rise in market share of capital-eligible homicides was concurrent
with a rise in executions (21 in 1984 to 98 in 1999).
Figure 2c identifies similar trends over the same period in states without
the death penalty. Homicide rates are lower in these states over time, and the
partitioned rates reflect the general base rate differences between death penalty and nondeath penalty states. The pattern of capital-eligible homicides
fluctuates over time in a manner similar to the death penalty states. The
market share of capital-eligible homicides in the nondeath penalty states
varies erratically, between a high of 26% in both the early and later years of

93. See id.
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the time series to a low of 19% in 1988, a year when executions were rare.
The secular decline in noncapital homicides is sharpest beginning in 1995,
when New York State passed a death penalty statute and its capital-eligible
and other homicides were removed from this count.94
Every indication in the pattern over time of trends in death-eligible
homicides is inconsistent with the anticipated influence of either a death
penalty law or variations in rates of execution specifically on those types of
homicide that these laws target. First, there is little variation in the rates of
capital-eligible homicides over time. Second, the shape of the temporal
trends in capital-eligible homicides in death penalty states and nondeath penalty states is nearly identical. That is, there is no visible influence of the
death penalty on those cases where its impact should be concentrated. The
fluctuations are timed nearly identically, and the range is also identical, both
in timing and magnitude. Rates of death-eligible killings do not go down any
faster than non-eligible killings when execution rates go up, and the deatheligible types of killings are no greater a share of the total in states with no
death penalty. The trends in these death-eligible types of killings over time
are no different in active execution states than in nondeath penalty states.
There appears to be no difference in capital-eligible homicide rates that
can be attributed either to the presence of the death penalty or the frequency
of its use. One of the staples of the death penalty debate in the United States
is the interpretation of the base rate differences in homicides between death
penalty and nondeath penalty states. Critics of the death penalty point to this
differential as evidence of its weak deterrent effects.95 Our analysis provides
some confirmation of this claim, but for a very different reason: there is no
difference in the magnitude or temporal change in the subset of homicides
that should be most sensitive to the threat of execution.
D. Texas as a NaturalExperiment
Several studies in the new deterrence literature point to Texas as the
place where the deterrent effects of execution may be the strongest.96
Among states, Texas is the most frequent user of capital punishment in the
post-Gregg era, accounting for 369 of the 1,032 executions in the United

94. 1995 N.Y. Laws 2 (codified as amended at N.Y. PENAL LAW § 60.06 (McKinney 2005)).
95. SELLIN, supra note 25, at 34; see Donohue & Wolfers, supra note 10, at 800-04 (discussing
studies of the differences of homicide rates in death penalty and nondeath penalty states); see also
John Lamperti, Does Capital Punishment Deter Murder? (2001) (unpublished manuscript), available
at http://math.dartmouth.edu/-Iamperti/capitalpunishment.pdf (analyzing studies to conclude that
the death penalty does not deter or decrease the frequency of homicide).
96. See, e.g., Cloninger & Marchesini, supra note 10, at 571-76 (reporting empirical findings in
Texas consistent with the deterrent hypothesis); Joanna Shepherd, Deterrence Versus Brutalization:
CapitalPunishment's DifferingImpacts Among States, 104 MICH. L. REv. 203, 233 (2005) (finding
a strong deterrent effect in Texas). But see Berk, supra note 19, at 324, 328 (asserting that data give
a "false impression" of deterrence in Texas due to three outlier years).
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States since 1976. 97 This gives Texas unusual leverage on the relationship
between executions and homicides in comparative analyses across states.98
Indeed, recent social science analyses of general homicide patterns have
shown that the evidence of execution impact on total homicide can be dismissed for U.S. death states other than Texas. 99 And within Texas, both
death sentences and executions are concentrated in Harris County, which includes the city of Houston.10 0 Since 1976, Harris County has accounted for
90 of the 369 executions in Texas in the time since Gregg, more than twice
the number in Dallas County, the state's second highest contributor to
Texas's death row. 1° 1
In addition, 282 persons from Harris County have been sentenced to
death since Gregg, 10 2 and there are currently 137 on death row. 10 3 The
county's high execution rate affords it statistical influence on the deterrence
patterns that have been attributed to Texas. Accordingly, if executions show
a distinctive impact on death-eligible killings anywhere, Texas should be the
place. Given the high rate of executions in Texas, the case for the impact of
the death penalty on total homicide over time cannot be so easily dismissed
for Texas. Figures 3 and 4 show the trends in capital-eligible and noncapital
homicide rates for Texas and Harris County, and the market share of capitaleligible homicides in each.

97. According to DPIC, there have been 1,032 executions in the U.S. from Gregg through July
17,
2006.
See
Death
Penalty
Info.
Ctr.,
Executions
by
State,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=8&did=186.
98. See Berk, supra note 19, at 305 (explaining how the large number of executions in Texas
can skew statistical results).
99. Id. at 320-23.
100. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice, County of Conviction for Executed Offenders,
http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/stat/countyexecuted.htm. The Texas Department of Criminal Justice's
website displays a number of statistical tables about the death penalty, which are periodically
updated to take account of new death sentences, executions, and exonerations. This Article's
citations to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice reflect the statistics on its webpage as of July
17, 2006, and archived copies of those statistics as of that date are on file with the Texas Law
Review.

101. Id.
102. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice, Total Number of Offenders Sentenced to Death from Each

County, http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/stat/countysentenced.htm.
103. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice, County of Conviction for Offenders on Death Row,
http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/stat/countyconviction.htm.
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Figure 3: Capital and noncapital homicide rate per 100,000 persons and
percent capital, Texas, 1976-2003104
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The patterns in Texas closely resemble the patterns for all the death
penalty states shown in Figure 2b. Capital-eligible homicides rise and fall
over time, varying from a rate of 2 per 100,000 persons in 1976 to a peak of
4 before declining to a low rate of 1.8 in 1999 and beginning a shallow rise in
the next four years through 2003. The rates fell by nearly half, from 4 per
100,000 persons, to less than 2 in 1996. The market share of capital-eligible
homicides rises across the entire interval, and nearly doubles from 15% in
1988 to 29% in 2003. Similar to other states, noncapital homicides dropped
sharply from 1990 to 1998 and have remained stable since. Since Texas resumed executions in 1982, its execution activity was consistently well above
the national average for death penalty states. 10 5 But executions were
extraordinarily high between 1996 and 2003. More than two-thirds of the
post-Gregg executions took place in those years, with a peak of 40
executions in 2000 and another peak of 33 executions in 2002.06 During this
time, the rate of capital-eligible homicides was virtually unchanged, from 1.8
per 100,000 persons in 1996 to 2.0 in 2003.
One would expect the rate of capital-eligible homicides to decline
steadily during years when there is very high execution activity. Assuming
that would-be offenders who might be sensitive to execution risk are updating their information frequently, these updates based on high execution risk
seem to have had little effect on the commission of capital-eligible murders.
Executions in Texas were proceeding at a very high rate during this time,
averaging almost three per month during the four-year period from 1997 to

104. See SHR, supra note 71.
105. See Death Penalty Info. Ctr., supra note 97 (showing that Texas has executed 369 inmates
since 1972, far outstripping second-place Virginia, with 95).
106. Tex.
Dep't
of
Criminal
Justice,
Executions
by
Year,
http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/stat/annual.htm.
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2000 inclusive. 0 7 Even allowing for a lag of a year or more, capital-eligible
homicide rates in the succeeding
years seemed unresponsive to the increase
08
in executions in the late 1990s.1
Figure 4: Capital and noncapital homicide rate per 100,000 persons and
fraction capital, Harris County, 1976-2003 109
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The second natural experiment is Harris County. A single county case
study has strong internal validity, due to the stability over time in legal
contexts that surround the decision to seek and apply the death penalty, and
the absence of noise from variations in legal contexts and the factors that
may drive murder rates over time in other parts of the state and the
country.' 1 0 Consistent with statewide trends in Texas and national trends in
the death penalty states, the market share of capital-eligible homicides rose in
Harris County from the onset of post-Gregg executions through 2003.
Figure 4 also shows that the temporal fluctuation in the rate of capitaleligible homicides in Harris County is nearly identical to the statewide and
national trends."' Rates remained stable from 1996 through 2001, the period

107. Id.
108. The period when such updates take place is a matter of theoretical speculation. At least
one proponent of the deterrent effects of execution has suggested that updates may be as frequent as
monthly. See, e.g., Shepherd, supra note 15, at 309 (suggesting that "capital punishment's deterrent
effect is captured in the monthly data regardless of the particulars of the model").
109. See SHR, supra note 71.
110. See, e.g., JAMES EISENSTEIN & HERBERT JACOB, FELONY JUSTICE: AN ORGANIZATIONAL
ANALYSIS OF CRIMINAL COURTS (1977) (discussing court processes in Baltimore, Chicago, and
Detroit and showing how stable working groups of court officers function in courts to establish
shared guidelines and rules for the evaluation and disposition of criminal cases).
11. We retained data from 1982, when rates were sharply lower than other years, despite the
indication of problems in data compilation and reporting for Harris County in that year.
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when execution activity in the state was at its peak. Noncapital homicides
declined sharply from 1991 through 2000, in the same periods, capitaleligible homicides fell before rising after 2000. There was little change in
capital-eligible homicides in Texas following the surge in executions in the
late 1990s, and rates remained stable as executions declined in Texas after
1999.
Together, the Texas and Harris County exercises confirm the trends
across death penalty states: the market share of homicides that are capitaleligible continued to rise in the face of higher execution rates.
E. The Opposite of Economics?
The most logical test of "price effect" deterrence, that is whether the
threat of death is driving homicide fluctuations in death penalty states, is
whether the subset of killings threatened with death decline more sharply
than in states where an execution will not happen. As executions go up, the
percentage of homicides where a death sentence is possible should go down
in the death penalty states, and particularly in Texas, the only state with any
apparent deterrence in the aggregate homicide data.1 12 But there should be
no such fluctuation in nondeath penalty states because there is no death threat
for this class of cases.
This distinctive pattern does not happen. The patterns are visible to the
naked eye. The fingerprint for execution influence is missing from Harris
County, from Texas as a whole, and from all death penalty states. Instead,
the market share is rising everywhere except the nondeath penalty states.
Offenders faced with the threat of execution are not substituting less risky
varieties of crime for crimes that lead to murder and capital risk, nor are they
abandoning the types of crimes that might lead to a capital offense. But they
do seem to be rejecting the types of murders that do not carry execution
risk. 113 Evidently, secular trends or risk factors other than executions are
animating the aggregate homicide totals in Texas and elsewhere. This is the
opposite of recent price effect economic theories of death penalty deterrence.
The insensitivity of capital-eligible homicides to execution trends is
especially surprising when considered in the context of the sharply declining
rates of other homicides. As these noncapital-eligible homicides decrease in
number, it would be logical that police and prosecutors would devote more
attention to the smaller number of capital-eligible cases. Greater resources
would be available for police investigations and clearance rates should
improve. Prosecutors also would have more time and greater resources to
devote to these cases, increasing the likelihood of lengthy prison sentences if
not capital sentences. Yet even this concentration of criminal justice re1

112. See Berk, supra note 19, at 320-24 (finding that all of the generalized deterrent effects in
studies are attributable to Texas).
113. Figure 2b shows an overall declining trend of noncapital homicide rates in all death
penalty states. Even when only examining Texas, Figure 3 confirms that trend.
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sources on capital-eligible cases has not leveraged a decline in the rate of
capital-eligible homicides.
The trends argue not against deterrence, but against the marginal
deterrent effects of execution threats.
Prison sentences and prison
populations have been increasing dramatically since 1978,114 and the largest
segment of the prison population is inmates convicted of violent crimes.1 15
At year end in 2002, there were 2.1 million persons incarcerated in state
116
prisons, including an estimated 624,900 prisoners for a violent offense.
Overall, the 2004 incarceration rate in state prisons was 486 per 100,000
population 17 The high rate of incarceration and the increasingly lengthy
sentences imposed for violent offenses 18 may leave little margin for additional deterrent effects from the threat of execution.
In fact, the marginal punishment cost from the threat of execution may
be discounted in the modal category of capital-eligible crimes: felony
murders-homicides committed in the course of other crimes, especially
robbery. The logic of criminal careers and the composition of the pool of
capital-eligible homicides combine to argue against a marginal deterrent effect from the threat of execution. Robbery is not a crime that is committed
casually, nor are robbers a random sample of the criminal population. Most
have prior arrest records and many have completed spells in prison.' 19 Most
acknowledge the risk of punishment as intrinsic to their work yet tend to discount the cost of punishment or overvalue present benefits of the robbery, or
both. 120 Moreover, the situational dynamics of robbery are volatile and
unpredictable, and there is a very weak prospect that a risk heuristic of
punishment will enter into the intense street dynamics of robbery interactions

114. Alfred Blumstein & Allen J. Beck, Population Growth in U.S. Prisons, 1980-1996, 26
CRIME & JUST. 17, 18 (1999) ("Beginning in the early 1970s, the incarceration rate began a period
of continuous growth of approximately 6.3 percent per year that has continued largely unabated to
the present.").
115. Paige M. Harrison & Allen J. Beck, Prisonersin 2004, BUREAU JUST. STAT. BULL., Oct.
2005, at 3 tbl.3, availableat http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/p04.pdf.
116. Id. at 9.
117. Id. at 3, 4 tbl.4.
118. In 2002, the average state prison sentence for a violent offense was eighty-four months, a
rate that excludes life sentences. Matthew R. Durose & Patrick A. Langan, Felony Sentences in
State Courts, 2002, BUREAU JUST. STAT. BULL., Dec. 2004, at 4, available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fssc02.pdf.
119. See, e.g., RICHARD T. WRIGHT & SCOTT H. DECKER, ARMED ROBBERS IN ACTION:
STICKUPS AND STREET CULTURE 14 (1997). Wright and Decker interviewed men whose criminal
careers included repeated robberies. Robbers were committed to a street culture that emphasized
the material rewards and social status attendant to being successful "stick candy men," while
minimizing or heavily discounting punishment risk. Id. at 16; see also KATZ, supra note 32, at 165
(stating that robbers who "persist in robbery for several years. .. must anticipate a break in their
career for a long term of incarceration"); MERCER L. SULLIVAN, "GETTING PAID": YOUTH CRIME
AND WORK IN THE INNER CITY (1989) (examining the lives of three Brooklyn-area youths who had
prior arrest records before committing robberies).
120. WRIGHT & DECKER, supra note 119, at 118.
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to reduce the risk of lethality, 121 especially when a gun is present. The presence of a gun in a robbery further increases not just the risk of lethality but
the decision by the robber to use it. 122 In other words, there is a strong risk of
cognitive errors in situations of intense arousal-errors
that are likely to
23
mitigate the deterrent effects of punishment risk. 1
Felony murder offenders should be deterred both by the threat of prison
and the threat of execution. But there seems to be no visible marginal threat
from execution because both long prison sentences and execution are
punishment costs, not risks. Perhaps present-oriented offenders discount
such costs, reducing the salience of the threat of execution, leaving the
margin for deterrence very thin.
III. Estimating the Deterrent Effects of Execution on Capital Homicides
A. Design
We use panel methods to estimate a series of regression models to
identify the effects of capital punishment on the rate of capital-eligible
homicides from the resumption of capital punishment in the United States in
1976 following Gregg through 2002. We estimate models both for the nation
and for Texas. The panel structure of the data lends itself to a class of statistical models that explicitly examine how time-varying factors-including
capital punishment and other social and legal conditions-influence homicide trajectories that vary through time in an autoregressive structure.
Consistent with Sellin's strategy for estimating the effects of capital
punishment, 24 we include estimators for states that do not have the death
penalty. In the logic of experiments, an effect of execution on the homicide
rate should be observed only in the states that have or use the death penalty.

121. Id.; see also Jack Katz, The Motivation of the PersistentRobber, 14 CRIME & JUST. 277,

283-290 (1991) (arguing that robbers do not engage in rational behavior); Franklin Zimring &
James Zuehl, Victim Injury and Death in Urban Robbery: A Chicago Study, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 1,
33 (1986) (arguing that the malice rule, or any variation, would likely have a small effect on
robbery behavior).
122. See Deanna L. Williams & Jeffery Fagan, The Role of Firearms in Violence "Scripts":
The Dynamics of Gun Events Among Adolescent Males, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1996, at
55, 71 (noting that "the availability and lethal nature of firearms has resulted in offenders taking on
'risky or harder' targets, anticipating little or no resistance when using a lethal weapon"); Deanna L.
Williams & Jeffrey Fagan, Social Contexts and Functions ofAdolescent Violence, in VIOLENCE IN
AMERICAN SCHOOLS: A NEW PERSPECTIVE 55, 62 (D.S. Elliott et al. eds., 1999) ("The availability
of a firearm may encourage a robber to... rely on a threat of force which may or may not need to
be followed through."); Ziniring & Zuehl, supra note 121, at 14-16 (showing, statistically, that
robberies involving guns are more likely to be lethal).
123. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values and Frames, 39 AM.

PSYCHOLOGIST 341, 349 (1984) (finding that "an individual's subjective state can be improved by
framing negative outcomes as costs rather than as losses").
124. Thorsten

Sellin, Homicides in Retentionist and Abolitionist States, in CAPITAL

PUNISHMENT 135, 135 (Thorsten Sellin ed., 1967); see also Thorsten Sellin, Experiments with
Abolition, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra, at 122, 122.
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In states with the death penalty, the logic of medical experiments suggests
that we also investigate how responsive each state is to varying dosages of a
"treatment" like capital punishment. Accordingly, we include two measures
of capital punishment: the existence of a death penalty statute in each state
for each year in the panel and then the number of executions and death sentences in the state for each of the preceding three years.
We adjust the estimates of deterrence to control for variations from state
to state in the base rates of homicide by including the noncapital homicide
rate in each state for each year (lagged by one year). This strategy allows us
to estimate whether the changes in the noncapital homicide rate are influencing the rate of capital homicides. Using population-averaged models, we
scale the number of executions to each state's population to ensure that any
deterrent effects from execution are weighted proportionately to the state's
population.
We include a rich set of socioeconomic and criminal justice system
variables that are robust correlates of the murder rate within and between
states over time; these correlates and predictors of homicide have been validated extensively in research across cities and states over the past three
decades. 125 However, some of these factors also may be spuriously
correlated with the adoption of capital punishment and its use, 126 and
statistical methods are needed to sort out these multiple and overlapping
factors and to better isolate the causal effect of executions above and beyond
the endogenous reasons why it is used.
For example, the rate at which prosecutors may seek the death penalty,
the rate at which judges and juries might impose it, and the rate at which
states may carry out death sentences, all may be correlated with the onset of
other criminal justice measures, such as tough sentencing laws or expanded
death penalty eligibility, that are designed to "get tough on crime." Estimating the effects of capital punishment is further complicated by contemporaneous increases in the likelihood of incarceration, longer prison sentences
including "natural" life sentences (or life without parole) that may compete
with the threat of execution to deter homicides. And, these contingencies
also may deter other crimes as well.
We are particularly interested in the effects of incarceration rates in
assessing whether punishment risks compete with other social and legal

125. See Krivo & Peterson, supra note 54, at 558; Land et al., supra note 54, at 951; Sampson
& Lauritsen, supra note 54, at 48.
126. See JAMES LIEBMAN ET AL., A BROKEN SYSTEM PART 1I: WHY THERE IS SO MUCH
ERROR IN CAPITAL CASES, AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT 425 (2002), available at

http://www2.1aw.columbia.edu/brokensystem2/report.pdf (showing that factors including the
poverty rate, the percent of the population that is African American, and indices of each state's
punitiveness (or use of incarceration) predict the use of the death penalty and the number and rate of
reversals of death sentences).
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factors, including capital punishment, and in predicting changes in homicide
rates over time. 127 Since robbery-homicide is the paradigm crime among the
subset of felony murders that are capital-eligible homicides,1 28 we also include an index for the robbery rate to control for the supply of events that
might produce capital-eligible homicides. We use alternate analytic methods
that consider time trends in different ways, including procedures that account
for the strong autocorrelation or stationarity of homicide rates over time, and
we develop parameters to address selection biases inherent in the decisions of
states to adopt the death penalty.
B. Model Estimation
Several new studies claim strong deterrent effects of capital
punishment. 29 They share a common econometric language and preferences
for particular analytic strategies. Typically, these studies use panel data on
murder rates within states or counties over a number of years. We use that
form to begin the analysis. The general analytic form is a regression
equation where the murder rate in each state and year in the time series (or
panel) is the dependent variable, and the predictors are a linear combination
of fixed effects including the presence of a death penalty law in a given state
and the predictability of execution given a death sentence in some previous
era. Covariates include state effects that account for differences between the
states and year effects that account for national time trends that affect the
states. The general model form is:
Yij = Pij_IDETERRENCE + yijCONTROLS + 6ijNONCAP + gi + rlj + eij
where Yij is the rate of capital-eligible murders in state i and year j,
DETERRENCE is a combination of execution and death sentence measures
lagged for different periods, and CONTROLS is a combination of state social
and economic characteristics that are well known predictors of both criminal
activity and the use of the death penalty. We include each state's robbery
rate in each year in this set of covariates, since robberies are a measure both
of the general level of criminal activity and also of the potential supply of
robbery-homicide incidents that comprise a significant portion of capital127. See, e.g., Katz et al., supra note 10, at 339-40 (reporting a negative correlation between
prison death rates-a proxy for poor prison conditions-and crime rates, but finding little deterrent
effect of capital punishment); see also Fagan, supra note 19 (critiquing recent research on the
deterrent effects of the death penalty for inadequately measuring and estimating the effects of
incarceration and other criminal justice policy measures on changes in the homicide rate); Levitt,
supra note 55, at 170-83 (finding four factors that explain the nationwide decrease in crime: the
expansion in the number of police, the increasing prison population, the retreating epidemic of crack
cocaine, and the legalization of abortion).
128. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
129. See Hearing,supra note 13, at 10-11, 14-16 (discussing the results of thirteen studies that
found deterrent effects); see also Donohue & Wolfers, supra note 10 (surveying the data from
several studies that found deterrent effects); Fagan, supra note 19 (same).
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eligible crimes. 130 In this study, where the market share of homicides that are
capital-eligible is a central question, we also include the rate of noncapitaleligible homicides, NONCAP. (Details on these measures are discussed in
the next section.) State and year fixed effects (pi + r~j) also are included in
the estimation. 131 In this study, we estimate first a state-level model and next
a model with counties in Texas.
We begin the analysis by estimating this model form to determine how
the death penalty influences the rate of capital-eligible homicides, with the
presence of a death penalty statute in each state and year as the deterrence
measure. Next, we estimate similar models but this time using measures of
executions and death sentences as the deterrence variables. For each of these
versions of deterrence, we first estimate a model with predictors limited to
the rate of noncapital homicides and the covariates. We then re-estimate the
models with the deterrence variables included.
In this general model form, using fixed effects for states (or counties)
and years treats each area as having inherent unobservable characteristics
that are consistent over time and independent of other areas. Likewise, the
use of fixed effects treats each year as a separate experimental period, with
its own characteristics that are independent of the previous year's. Such
models are common in the recent deterrence literature, and we thus begin
with a fixed effects model predicting capital homicide rates based on these
state and year characteristics and controlling for noncapital homicide rates.
However, the reality of panel data suggests that this method will
produce biased estimates: the strategy ignores the fact that murder rates
within states vary through time, and that murder rates, whether within states
or counties, are serially correlated over time.1 32 This is the problem of
autoregression, or serial correlation: the tendency of trends in longitudinal or
time series data to be heavily influenced by the trends in preceding years.
Statistically and conceptually, it is unlikely that effects of extremely rare
events such as executions can influence trends that are so heavily influenced
133
by their own history.

130. See supra Tables 1 & 2.
13 1. Most studies estimate models with states as the unit of analysis, while others include
models where county murder rates are predicted from a combination of state- and county-level
predictors. See, e.g., Hashem Dezhbakhsh et al., Does CapitalPunishment Have a DeterrentEffect?
New Evidencefrom PostmoratoriumPanel Data, 5 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 344 (2003).
132. See, e.g., Marianne Bertrand et al., How Much Should We Trust Differences-in-Differences
Estimates?, 119 Q.J. ECON. 249 (2004) (highlighting the problem of serial correlation in
differences-in-differences estimations of causal relationships); see also Alberto Abadie,
Semiparametric Difference-in-Differences Estimators, 72 REV. ECON. STUD. 1 (2005) (addressing
some of the difficulties in the use of the difference-in-differences estimator to exclude variations
created by serial correlation).
133. See Berk, supra note 19, at 311 (finding that "most of the variation in homicides is simply
a function of the average number of homicides in each state" and that the number of executions
adds "virtually nothing" to the analysis); see also BADI H. BALTAGI, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF

2006)

Capital Punishment and Capital Murder

1837

One class of models designed for these circumstances is hierarchical
regression models that generate growth curves or trajectories of change over
time. These regression models can identify the parameters that shape a pattern or sequence of behaviors over time, also known as a trajectory or growth
curve, and estimate the effects of interventions or treatments that might influence these patterns. 134 The trajectories can be modeled using hierarchical
or mixed effects estimation, in which some variables are considered fixed
and others random. Variables are analyzed as fixed effects when we assume
that they are measured without error, or that they are constant across studies.
So, for example, variables such as population, the number of executions or
death sentences, or the incarcerated population are fixed effects. In the second set of models, then, variables are analyzed as random effects when we
assume they have measurement error, or when we are making inferences or
generalizations to some probability distribution.
In this class of mixed effects growth curve models, the independent
variables are modeled as fixed effects. Time is modeled both as a fixed effect to control for the effects of specific years in the time series, and a random effect, to estimate the rate of change over time in the dependent
variable. Of particular interest in this class of models is the interaction of
time with each of the fixed effects. This interaction allows the influence of a
fixed effect to vary over time as the fixed effect itself changes. Accordingly,
the interactions show whether and how the rate of change in the dependent
variable over time is affected by the values of the predictor or independent
variable at different points in time. 135

PANEL DATA 84 (2001); Badi H. Baltagi & Qi Li, Testing AR(1) Against MA (1) Disturbancesin an
Error Component Model, 68 J. ECONOMETRICS 133 (1995); Robert C. Jung & A.R. Tremayne,
Testing for Serial Dependence in Time Series Models of Counts, 24 J. TIME SERIES ANALYSIS 65
(2003).
134. See, e.g., STEPHEN W. RAUDENBUSH & ANTHONY S. BRYK, HIERARCHICAL LINEAR
MODELS 163-202 (2d ed. 2002); JUDITH SINGER & JOHN B. WILLET-, APPLIED LONGITUDINAL

DATA ANALYSIS: MODELING CHANGE AND EVENT OCCURRENCE 4 (2003); Sophia Rabe-Hesketh
et al., Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Limited and Discrete Dependent Variable Models with
Nested Random Effects, 128 J. ECONOMETRICS 301 (2005) (conducting simulation studies
indicating that adaptive quadrature presents "unbiased estimates for random component probit

models").
135. Panel data often are troubled by correlated error terms over time in the relationships
between the dependent variables and the predictors. To adjust for this problem, the models are
estimated using AR(1) covariance structures. See generally WILLIAM H. GREENE, ECONOMETRIC
ANALYSIS 592 (4th ed. 2000).
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The general model follows the form:
Yij = Yoo + y1OTIME + yoIDETERRENCE + yi I(DETERRENCE* TIME) +
Y2PUNISHMENT + y12(PUNISHMENT * TIME)] +
yo3 OTHERCRIME + Y13(OTHERCRIME * TIME)] +
y 4DEMOECON + Y14(DEMOECON * TIME)] +
[ i0+ iITIME + Eij]
where Yij is the rate of capital-eligible homicides (per 100,000
population) in state i and yearj, and DETERRENCE is a vector of variables
including death sentences and executions. 136 We use the natural log of the
capital homicide rate. The deterrence measures include separate contributions of executions lagged one year (year j-1), and a three-year moving
average of death sentences prior to the current year in state i (years j-J, j-2,
and j-3). 137 We also test an alternate and simplified model with a binary
measure of whether there is a valid death penalty statute in effect in the prior
year. PUNISHMENT is an alternate deterrence measure that indexes state
prison incarceration to the felony crime rate.13 8 The cross-level interactions
of each predictor with TIME identify whether the effects of TIME differ by
levels of the theoretical predictors-i.e., whether executions, death sentences,
or punishment variables are, in fact, associated over time with a decrease in
homicide rates. This is the critical test. 139 We use two alternate measures of
time, a linear time function and a quadratic time function that reflects the
non-linear trends in homicides over time.
The models include fixed effects for two crime patterns in the previous
year. First, we control for the natural log of the rate of noncapital-eligible
homicides as an index of the general level of lethal violence. Second, we
include the natural log of the robbery complaint rate to control for the supply
of events that might increase the supply of capital-eligible homicides. Both
the state and county models include covariates to control for socioeconomic
factors 140 that may influence both crime rates and the preferences of the

136. We also included measures of homicide trends for 1968-1976 in state i and year j to
control for longer term homicide trends within states. However, Supplementary Homicide Report
coding in this era did not include information on situations and circumstances to allow for
classification of homicides as capital-eligible or noncapital-eligible.
137. We assume that a three-year period for recall of death sentences is a reasonable reflection
given the present orientation of criminal offenders, and specifically of homicide offenders. See
Fagan, supra note 19.
138. In state-level models, PUNISHMENT is the lagged natural logarithm of the punishment
index. In the county-level models for Texas, this variable represents the state prison population
measure in the given year.
139. See SINGER & WILLETT, supra note 134, at 3 ("Today we know it is possible to measure
change, and to do it well, ifyou have longitudinaldata....").
140. In the state-level model, these factors include: the percent of the population in poverty, the
Gini index of inequality, the percent of the population in the "peak crime age range" of 15-24, the
percent of the population aged 65 or over, the logged population size, the percent of the population
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criminal justice system for more punitive criminal justice policies, especially
incarceration, 14 1 death sentences,1 42 and also the overproduction of death
sentences that lead to high rates of reversible errors. 143
Prior studies using counties to estimate deterrent effects of the death
penalty also ignore a second problem common to smaller spatial units: spatial
autocorrelation, or spatial lag, 144 where the murder rates in a particular
county may also reflect processes that are taking place in the adjacent counties and may create noise in the estimates for a particular county. The Texas
county-level models thus also included a measure of spatial autocorrelation
for general crime trends
of time-lagged murder rates. This strategy controls
145

in neighboring counties, as well as over time.
We include two types of random effects: Oi, a random intercept, and (Ii,
a random effect of time. The random intercept reflects the fact that while
capital-eligible homicide rates are estimated to vary based on the effects of
deterrence variables and other predictors, states and counties also differ on
unobservable characteristics which might affect the starting points of each
trajectory at the outset of the time series. The random intercept provides the
flexibility with which these differences can be modeled. Likewise, a random
effect for time generates estimates of the variance components attributable to

living in urban areas, and the percent of the population that is black. In the county model, the
demographic and economic factors include the poverty rate and Gini index, the logged population
size, and the percent of the population aged 15-24.
141. See, e.g., David Jacobs & Jason T. Carmichael, The Politics of Punishment across Time
and Space: A Pooled Time-Series Analysis of Imprisonment Rates, 80 SOC. FORCES 61 (2001)
(showing that over a 60 year period, net of poverty and social disorganization, religious
fundamentalism, political conservatism, and the rate of violent crimes, Republican strength and
minority threat lead to higher imprisonment rates); David Jacobs & Ronald E. Helms, Toward a
PoliticalModel of Incarceration:A Time-Series Examination of Multiple Explanations For Prison
Admission Rates, 102 AM. J. SOC. 323 (1996) (examining different economic and political factors to
explain shifts in prison admissions since 1950).
142. David Jacobs & Jason T. Carmichael, The Political Sociology of the Death Penalty: A
Pooled Time-Series Analysis, 67 AM. Soc. REV. 109, 126-27 (2002) (showing that racial tipping
points in the population and economic inequality are significant predictors of the adoption of death
statutes in states following Furman and Gregg).
143. See, e.g., LIEBMAN ET AL., supra note 126.
144. Estimating the murder rate in a county without acknowledging what is going on next door
may overstate the effect of a causal factor that is unique to that county. In other words, the
estimates of deterrence or any other causal factor may simply be picking up the effects of causal
factors operating nearby but not necessarily within the county itself. For a general discussion of
spatial autocorrelation, see Edward Bullmore et al., In Praise of Tedious Permutation, in SPATIAL
STATISTICS: METHODOLOGICAL ASPECTS AND APPLICATIONS 183, 190 (Marc Moore ed., 2001).
145. Spatial lag measures were available only through 1999, and the models were artifactually
truncated at 1997 due to the inclusion of measures that were lagged as much as three years. The
early termination of the time series could produce biased results that would change if later years
were included. Since the effects of spatial lag were not significant in this first set of models, we reestimated the models excluding the spatial lag measures and report those results. This strategy
allowed us to include a larger number of years in the panel, including two years following the 1999
spike in executions in Texas.
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differences in the state-specific or county-specific slopes of capital-eligible
homicide trajectories. All estimates are population-averaged,
and an autore146
assumed.
is
structure
covariance
1])
(AR[
gressive
While the state models use a linear estimation, the distribution of capital
homicides in the county-level rates in Texas requires a different estimation
method. The capital homicide rates by county are skewed: 4,763 county-year
observations out of 6,240 county-years have no capital-eligible homicides,
the range is from zero to 213 capital homicides, and the standard deviation
(8.9) is far higher than the mean (1.5). Even with population-averaging, we
still observe a nonlinear skewed distribution. In circumstances such as this
where the distribution is nonlinear and right-skewed, a Poisson distribution
provides a more efficient and accurate method to estimate the mixed effects
regression.
Poisson techniques are appropriate to identify factors that predict the
147
number of occurrences of an event within a specific observation period.
The Poisson distribution is a discrete distribution which takes on the values
y = 0, 1, 2, 3 .....
Poisson distributions typically assume that events are
inevitable, and that they follow some known distribution or frequency
pattern. It is often used as a model for the number of events (such as the
number of telephone calls at a business or the number of accidents at an
intersection) in a specific time period. It is useful in studies of law and crime
to model phenomena such as the number of crimes or the number of prison
sentences. The probability distribution for a Poisson process is defined as:
N

Pr(y) = N 1Z Pr(yA[X,]).
i=l

The exact distribution depends on the expected rate of occurrence of the
event of interest (y), and X is a vector of explanatory variables. When y is
low, the distribution is skewed to the left. When y is high, the distribution
more closely resembles a normal distribution.
The estimations for Texas, then, follow the same analytic plan, with
county-year fixed effects estimations first followed by trajectory models
using mixed effects regressions to address time trends and autoregression in
homicide rates. The Texas models differ in that we use the Poisson distribution to model the count of capital-eligible homicides instead of the linear

146. See Baltagi & Li, supra note 133, at 139-43 (comparing MA(1) and AR(l) in an error
component model).
147. See, e.g., William Gardner et al., Regression Analyses of Counts and Rates: Poisson,
Overdispersed Poisson, and Negative Binomial Models, 118 PSYCHOL. BULL. 392, 396 (1995)
(explaining why Poisson regression is a more reasonable model for count data than a normal-errors
linear regression model); Kenneth C. Land et al., A Comparison ofPoisson, Negative Binomial, and
Semiparametric Mixed Poisson Regression Models with Empirical Applications to Criminal
Careers Data,24 SOC. METHODS & RES. 387 (1996).
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form that estimates the rates. 48 We use an overdispersion correction 49 to
adjust the standard errors for the large number of zeros observations, and use
the log of the county population as the exposure measure.
150

C. Data and Measures

Specific variables and their data sources are described in Appendix B.
Appendix C reports means and standard deviations for all variables.
Homicide data were obtained from the Supplementary Homicide Reports,
part of the FBI Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) archives. 15 The UCR is a
voluntary reporting system; data are compiled from police-agency reports
submitted annually. 52 Data on specific homicide events from 1976-2003
were obtained from the Supplementary Homicide Reports (SHR), which includes incident-level data on offense, offenders, and victims. 1 53 We used the
situation and circumstance information in each record to categorize homicides as capital-eligible or noncapital-eligible murders. The classification
method was described earlier in Part II, and was vetted against two databases
of actual executions. 54 While the SHR has varying patterns of missing data
patterns that could produce nonclassical measurement error,' 55 the market-

148. We considered using a Zero-Inflated Poisson (ZIP) model, an alternate form of poisson
regressions that are often used when there are excessive numbers of zero values. See generally
Diane Lambert, Zero-Inflated PoissonRegression, with an Application to Defects in Manufacturing,
34 TECHNOMETRICS 1 (1992); Christopher JW. Zorn, An Analytic and Empirical Examination of
Zero-Inflated and Hurdle Poisson Specifications, 26 SOC. METHODS & RES. 368 (1998) (comparing

the zero-inflated Poisson model to the hurdle event count model). However, ZIP models may
produce uninterpretable standard errors when the data are nested, as is the case here. See Quang H.
Vuong, Likelihood Ratio Testsfor Model Selection and Non-nested Hypotheses, 57 ECONOMETRICA

307 (1989).
149. See Gardner et al., supra note 147, at 397-99. Overdispersion occurs when the observed
variance of the data is larger than the predicted variance. Id. at 396. A parameter, called the
dispersion parameter, 4),is introduced to the model to lower this overdispersion effect, and is
estimated as:
=( - ,)- N (y " -/h[X ',d]) 2
N2

Id. at 397.
150. Data and statistical code for this study are from the authors at
http://www2.law.columbia.edu/fagan/researchdata/caphom/.
151. SHR, supra note 71.
152. MALTZ, supra note 23, at 1.
153. SHR, supra note 71. Additional SHR data were obtained for the period 1968-1976, but
these records did not include the types of detailed event information that would permit classification
of each homicide as capital-eligible or noncapital-eligible. Marc Riedel & Margaret Zahn, Trends
in American Homicide, 1968-1978: Victim-Level Supplementary Homicide Reports (ICPSR Study
No. 8676, 1994), availableat http://webapp.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/ICPSR-STUDY/08676.xml.
154. See supra subpart II(B).
155. The participation of agencies within states in the UCR reporting system is not
inconsistent. As a result, it is difficult to tell whether failure to report any homicides in any month
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share and disaggregation indicia are unlikely to be affected
by random pat56
terns of counties within states failing to report their data. 1
Data for the deterrence measures were obtained from records of state
trends in death sentences and executions maintained by the Death Penalty
Information Center (DPIC) 157 and the Bureau of Justice Statistics of the U.S.
Department of Justice.' 5 8 The DPIC database includes all death sentences
and executions from 1976 to 2003; no sampling was used or needed. The
deterrence vector includes measures of executions lagged one and two years,
and death sentences lagged one, two, and three years. We assume that
rationality among would-be murderers is limited by their present orientation
in estimating risk; 159 accordingly, we limit the recall periods in which they
identify events that might influence their subjective perceptions of execution

means that the agency did not comply or that there were no murders that year to report. See MALTZ,
supra note 23, at 5; see also Fagan, supra note 19. In both the state and county analyses, the annual
counts of homicides in the SHR were compared to homicide reports in the UCR. Observations in
which the SHR underestimated the UCR by more than 25% were designated as outliers and dropped
from the analysis. This results in the elimination of 185 of 1,300 observations in the state analysis
and 105 of 6,076 in the Texas analysis. In the Texas analysis, where 1985 data were missing from
the county UCR files and there was no basis for comparison with SHR files, a chi-squared test
found no significant differences in the distribution of 1985 SHR county homicides compared to
1983-1987 counts. Accordingly, the 1985 SHR observations were retained in the analysis.
156. The stable and nearly flat distribution of the capital-eligible homicide rates suggest that the
addition of missing values within states would be unlikely to alter the observed rates of capitaleligible homicides. See, e.g., Stevenson & Wolfers, supra note 77, at 275 n. 15.
157. DPIC, Searchable Database, supra note 88.
158. See Thomas P. Bonczar & Tracy L. Snell, CapitalPunishment, 2002, BUREAU JUST. STAT.
BULL., Nov. 2003, at 1-17, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cp02.pdf. The data
are publicly available at the National Archive of Criminal Justice Data, Institute for Social
Research, University of Michigan. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Capital
Punishment in the United States, 1973-2002 (ICPSR Study No. 3958, 2004), available at
http://webapp.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/ICPSR-STUDY/03958.xml.
159. See, e.g., Charles Dean et al., Criminal Propensities,Discrete Groups of Offenders, and
Persistence in Crime, 34 CRIMINOLOGY 547 (1996) (discussing various factors that effect a
criminal's low self-control in assessing present orientation, such as neuropsychological deficit,
upbringing, moral beliefs, and geographical location); Sarah Lichtenstein et al., Judged Frequency
of Lethal Events, 4 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM. LEARNING & MEMORY 551, 574-77 (1978)
(finding biases in the estimation of the frequency of lethal events due to "overestimation of [events
with] low frequencies and underestimation of... [events with] high frequencies"); Yair Listokin,
Future-OrientedGang Members? Gang Financesand the Theory of Present-OrientedCriminals,64
AM. J. ECON. & Soc. 1073 (2005) (noting that many individual crime-propensity theories stem from
the notion that "[a]s long as the gains from crime are immediate while the costs of crime are
delayed, present-oriented individuals will commit crimes"); Daniel S. Nagin & Greg Pogarsky,
Integrating Celerity, Impulsivity, and Extralegal Sanction Threats Into a Model of General
Deterrence: Theory and Evidence, 39 CRIMINOLOGY 865 (2001) (formulating a metric that utilizes
discounting to assess the effect of the celerity, severity, and certainty of punishment on a criminal
individual's decision-making process). For a review on risk perception and deterrence, see Paul H.
Robinson & John M. Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter? A Behavioral Scientist Investigation, 24
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 173 (2004), which reviews evidence from criminology and other
behavioral sciences and concludes that the deterrent effects of the criminal law are quite limited.
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risk.1 60 However, the lagged death sentence variables are highly correlated
(r = .89 1), so we use instead a moving average of death sentences in the prior
three years. This variable is highly skewed, so we use the natural log of the
moving average.
Data on robbery complaints were obtained from the UCR archives that
61
Countyare maintained and published by the U.S. Department of 1Justice.'
62
sources.
same
the
from
obtained
were
Texas
for
level data
The covariates include measures that are correlated with both murder
and also with the use of the death penalty. Following the measurement strategy of Professor David Jacobs and Jason Carmichael, 163 and a similar
strategy used by Professor James Liebman and his colleagues,' 64 we include
measures of the percentage of the population that is African American and
the percentage of the population with incomes below the poverty line. To
further identify inequality, we use a Gini coefficient to measure inequality
within each state and year.165 Other demographic controls include measures
of the percentage of the population located in urban areas, since murder rates
are higher in cities and other areas with higher population density. 66 We
also include a measure of the percentage of the population that is between 15
and 24 years of age, because homicide rates were most volatile for this age
group, especially during cyclical spikes in homicide rates. 67 We use a measure of the ratio of persons aged 35 and older to persons under 15 as an index
of supervision or social control.' 68 To control for the tendency of states to
incarcerate noncapital homicide offenders, thereby deterring some murderers
160. See, e.g., Chris Guthrie, Prospect Theory, Risk Preference, and the Law, 97 Nw. U. L.
REv. 1115, 1116-19 (2003) (explaining four different mechanisms by which people make risky
decisions).
161. See SHR, supra note 71.
162. County-level crime reports were missing from the UCR in 1985. Since our models use a
one-year lagged measure of robbery reports as a predictor of capital homicide, the missing UCR
data caused all 1986 data to be dropped from the county analysis.
163. Jacobs & Carmichael, supra note 142, at 117.
164. LIEBMANETAL., supra note 126, at 136-37, 144.
165. The Gini coefficient is a measure of inequality of a distribution. It ranges between 0 and 1,
where 0 corresponds to perfect equality (e.g. everyone has the same income) and 1 corresponds to
perfect inequality (e.g. one person has all the income, and everyone else has zero income). The Gini
coefficient (G) is computed as:
G=I-F fi(Pi+pi~l)

where:
f,is the proportion of households in interval i
pi is the proportion of total income received by recipients in interval i and all lower intervals.
See, e.g., PAUL RYSCAVAGE, INCOME INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 38 (1999); Philip M. Dixon et al.,
Bootstrappingthe Gini Coefficient oflnequality, 68 ECOLOGY 1548 (1987).
166. Sampson & Lauritsen, supra note 54, at 54-55, 67-69.
167. See Philip J. Cook & John H. Laub, The UnprecedentedEpidemic of Youth Violence, 24
CRIME & JUST. 27 (1998) (discussing the role of youth in violent crimes, particularly homicides).
168. Sampson & Lauritsen, supra note 54, at 58.
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from further acts of lethal violence, we include an interaction of the punishment index with the noncapital homicide rate. Finally, a dummy variable is
included to control for the effects of the mass killing of 168 persons in the
Oklahoma City federal building bombing in 1995.
To estimate the punitive orientation of state criminal justice policies we
include measures of punishment risk--defined as the number of state prison
inmates per felony crime. We lag this measure by one year and use its natural log due to skew across the states.
Some studies use instrumental variables to resolve potential endogeneity
in these relationships. For example, Hashem Dezhbakhsh and his colleagues
use indicators of partisan political influence and police and judicial expenditures to sort out the relationship between population characteristics and crime
rates, criminal justice policies, and use of the death penalty.' 69 However,
these instruments are correlated not only with the existence of the death
7
penalty in a state, 7 ° but also with death sentences and executions,' '
incarceration rates, 172 and because these indicia are more salient in death
penalty states where murder rates are higher, 173 with homicide rates. The
potential for biases are not insignificant and require attention. 174
The strategy for this analysis-random intercepts for capital homicide
rates, fixed effects for states, lagged deterrence measures, and an
autoregressive covariance structure-addresses a portion of the potential
bias. To further identify the selection biases in state preferences for the death
penalty and its endogeneity with predictors of murder, we estimate selection
effects by modeling them directly against the presence of a death statute.
This parameter captures differences between death penalty and nondeath
penalty states, controlling for factors correlated both with homicide and with
the presence of a death statute. To derive it, we estimate a logistic model
using the overall murder rate, incarceration per felony crime, and the set of
socioeconomic variables discussed earlier to predict the presence of a death
penalty statute in each state-year. 75 The selection model assigns a predicted

169. Hashem Dezhbakhsh et al., supra note 131, at 356-59. Partisan political influence was
measured as the Republican presidential candidate's percentage of the vote in the most recent
presidential election. Id. at 357.
170. See generally Jacobs & Carmichael, supra note 142.
171. Id. at 121 tbl.2, 122 tbl.3; see also John Blume et al., ExplainingDeath Row's Population
and Racial Composition, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 165, 168 (2004).
172. David Jacobs & Ronald Helms, Toward a PoliticalSociology of Punishment, Politics

and Changes in the IncarceratedPopulation,30 Soc. Sci. REs. 171, 182 (2001) (showing that
each additional year of a Republican presidency increased the acceleration in the number of
prisoners, in state prisons).
173. Jacobs & Carmichael, supra note 142, at 119 tbl.1.
174. See, e.g., Richard A. Berk, Knowing When to Fold 'Em: An Essay on Evaluating the
Impact ofCEASEFIRE, COMPSTAT, and EXILE, 4 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 451 (2005).

175. The variables used to predict "statute" are the overall murder rate, robbery rate,
punishment index, percent aged 15-24, percent black, percent urban, poverty rate, and Gini
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"statute level" as each state's propensity to have a death penalty statute in
each year. We use this parameter to estimate the effects of the presence of a
death statute on capital-eligible homicides, in effect controlling for a state's
decision to impose it. Next, we use this parameter in conjunction with the
other deterrence variables to estimate the effects of the application of the
death penalty.
IV. Results
A. State Analyses
Tables 3 and 4 tell similar stories about the effects of death statutes,
death sentences, and executions on capital-eligible homicides. With different
specifications and different functional forms in each table, there appears to
be no evidence of deterrent effects of any component of capital punishment
on the rates of capital-eligible homicides.
Table 3 examines the effects of the presence of a death penalty statute,
apart from its implementation, in each state-year. Model 1 in Table 3 is a
baseline model with only the punishment index and the rate of noncapital
homicides (i.e., noncapital-eligible homicides) as predictors, with state and
year fixed effects and a rich set of covariates relevant to state murder rates.
In this functional form, there are no interactions with time; the coefficients
instead show the average effect across states and years, controlling for timevarying conditions within the states. As expected, noncapital homicides
exert a strong positive effect on the rate of capital-eligible homicides.
Incarceration, as an alternate source of deterrence, is not a statistically
significant predictor of capital homicides.

coefficient-all measured contemporaneously in the outcome year. The logistic model was
estimated with fixed year effects reflecting nationwide punishment trends over our time horizon.

1846

[Vol. 84:1803

Texas Law Review

Table 3:, Regressions of felony homicide rate by death penalty statute, 19782002 176
Fixed effects
Predictor
Noncapital
homicide rate

Model I

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

.260'*
(.035)

.281"*
(.037)
-.041
(.076)
-.005
(.027)

.376"**
(.045)

.371'*
(.051)
-.097
(.088)
-.225
(.043)

.377"**
(.038)
-.056
(.060)
-.201*
(.029)

-.0 1 1 "*
(.004)
.012
(.009)
.009*
(.003)

-.001
(.0002)
.0003
(.0005)
.0004
(.0002)

Statute
Punishment index
(lagged, logged)

Trajectory

.001
(.026)

-.243*
(.038)

Interactionswith Time
Noncapital
homicide rate

-.0 12 ***
(.004)

Statute
Punishment index
(lagged, logged)

.010***
(.003)

E]

State fixed effects

D

Year fixed effects
Covariates
Random intercepts
Time*Time

l

L

LI

0
Ei
]

LI

BIC

14519

13904

-764.6

-710.9

-527.7

N

1,017

973

1,017

973

973

Significance:

= p <.001, ** = p <.01, * = p <.05.

The presence of a death penalty statute is assessed in Model 2, and the
effect is not statistically significant. Recall that we use a "predicted statute
level" in lieu of the presence of the statute itself.1 77 This indicator reflects the
propensity of states to have a death statute, based on differences between
states in factors that are correlated with the presence of a death statute: the
homicide and robbery rates, population composition, and inequality. In

176. In Models 3-5, predictors for each year were nested within states, thereby controlling for
each state's unique effects over time.
177. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
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effect, it is an indicator of whether a state has the death penalty in a given
year, controlling for its propensity to enact it.
The results in Model 2 show that presence of a death statute does not
predict differences in state-years in the rate of capital-eligible homicides.
The parameter estimate is small, not statistically significant, and induces no
changes in the other estimates. Its only effect is to slightly reduce the standard errors of the other parameters in the model. Noncapital homicide rates
remain the strongest predictor of capital homicides. Comparing the fit
estimates (BIC) in Models 1 and 2, Model 2 improves the fit slightly
compared to Model 1 without the statute effect.
In Model 3, we introduce the effects of time, and estimate the changes
in the effects of each predictor over time. This model analyzes capitaleligible homicide rates as a trajectory in each state and identifies the effects
of the predictors in explaining the differences in trajectories in states with
and without the death penalty. Again, we use year fixed effects to account
for national trends in homicides. In lieu of state fixed effects, however, here
we use random intercepts to account for different starting points in each state
and random effects for time that effectively nests each time trend within a
specific state trajectory. Predictors are nested within states in this model
form, creating a specification that addresses each state's unique effects beyond what the covariates can capture. We also include the same set of
covariates as in Models 1 and 2. Readers unfamiliar with these estimation
techniques should read the upper portion of Models 3-5 in the same way as
the state-year fixed effects results in Models 1 and 2: these are the average
effects over time, but before considering the effects of trajectories through
time. 78 To identify whether the over-time trajectories of capital-eligible
homicide rates differ in death and nondeath penalty states and to identify
whether statutes explain the differences, readers should focus on the lower
portion of the table: the interactions of each predictor with time show the effects of each predictor on the rate of capital homicides over time. In this
model form, changes in the rate of change or trajectory of a dependent
variable are estimated from the interaction of time with each independent
variable.

179

Similar to Model 1, Model 3 shows baseline estimates without the
deterrence predictor. The lower portion of Model 3 shows that noncapital
homicide rates are significant negative predictors of the capital homicide
rate. Punishment is not significant through time. The effect for noncapital
homicides on capital homicides illustrates the market share phenomenon: as

178. The coefficients for noncapital homicides are greater in the trajectory models in the upper
portion of the table than in the fixed effects analysis in Models 1 and 2, in part because of the
explicit treatment of time in the covariance matrix.
179. SINGER & WILLETT, supra note 134, at 4.

1848

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 84:1803

the rate of noncapital homicides declines, it takes an increasingly large share
of the homicide "market."
Model 4 shows that the effects of death penalty statutes are not
significant, but even with this putative deterrent effect included in the
estimate, the market share of capital homicides still increases over time as
noncapital rates fall. The size and significance of the coefficient for
noncapital homicide rates are unchanged.
Again, there is a modest
improvement in model fit. Punishment again is significant.
Model 5 repeats Model 4, adding a quadratic time trend to the linear
time trend. This nonlinear time trend generates more restrictive tests of trajectories that include even small, temporary nonlinear trends within longer
time trends that appear invariant. The results are virtually unchanged from
Model 4. Again, the significant negative coefficient for the noncapital homicide rate suggests that the market share of homicides that are capital-eligible
increases over time, even in the presence of a death penalty statute.
Next, we turn to the effects of the components of deterrence that are
specific to the death penalty: executions and homicides. In Models 2, 4, and
5 in Table 4, we again include the predicted statute measure, an indicator of
each state's propensity to have the death penalty. We add measures of the
specific components of deterrence as indicators of the "dosage" of capital
punishment in each state. Obviously, these values are set to zero for nondeath states. By including the predicted statute indicator together with the
deterrence components, we include a measure of the deterrent threat from
having the death penalty "on the books" even in states where it is rarely or
never used.
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Table 4: Regressions of felony homicide rate by deterronce and punishment,
all states, 1978-2002180
Fixed effects
Model I

Predictor
Noncapital homicide rate

.260"**
(.035)

Statute
Executions (lag 1)
Executions (lag 2)
Death sentence (3' yr
moving average)
Punishment index (lagged,
logged)

.002
(.026)

Trajectory

Model 2

Model 3

.290*
(.039)
-.040
(.077)
.003"**
(.001)
-.
001
(.002)
-.
001
(.001)
-.
011
(.028)

.376"**
(.045)

-.242***
(.038)

Model 4
.356**
(.050)
.048
(.083)
-.002
(.009)
-.008
(.010)
-.
018
(.010)
-.289***
(.042)

Model 5,
.377**
(.039)
-.
093
(.063)
-.
001
(.006)
-.
012
(.006)
.007
(.008)
-.
193"*
(.031)

Interactions with time

.010**
(.003)

-.008"**
(.004)
.002
(.008)
.0002
(.0005)
.0003
(.0005)
-.
001
(.001)
.012"**
(.003)

0

El

El

El

0

0

0

0

0

10

z

0

]

0
l

0
0

Noncapital homicide rate

-.012"
(.004)

Statute
Executions (lag 1)
Executions (lag 2)
Death sentence (3 yr
moving average)
Punishment index (lagged,
logged)
State fixed effects

0

Year fixed effects

0

Covariates

-.
0006"**
(.0002)
.0004
(.0004)
.000
(.000)
.000
(.000)
.000
(.000)
.0004***
(.0002)

El
El

El

0
El

BIC

14520

13933

-764.6

-670.6

-454.2

N

1,017

973

1,017

973

973

Random intercepts
Time*Time

Significance:"**

= p < .001, ** = p <

.01,

*

p < .05.

180. In Models 3-5, predictors for each year were nested within states, thereby controlling for
each state's unique effects over time.

1850

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 84:1803

The first two models in Table 4 show results of fixed effects
regressions, and the last three models show results of trajectory analyses.
Model 1 repeats Model 1 from Table 3-with state and year fixed effects, a
rich set of covariates, and a fixed effect for incarceration risks (punishment).
In Model 2, we add three components of deterrence: executions in the
state lagged one and two years, and the three-year moving average of death
sentences in the state. We use moving averages because of the strong
collinearity among the three separate lagged death sentence counts for the
three prior years. The results are virtually unchanged from Model 2 in Table
3: there are no deterrent effects from any of the components of deterrence.
The coefficients for the deterrence components are small and not statistically
significant. The rate of noncapital homicides remains the strongest predictor,
averaged over time, of the capital homicide rate.
The trajectory analyses in Models 3-5 lead to the same conclusions as
the fixed effects analyses. Model 3 is a baseline trajectory model with only
the punishment index and the noncapital homicide rate included as
predictors. This model repeats Model 3 from Table 3, illustrating the strong
influence of noncapital homicide rates on capital homicide rates averaged
across time and the increasing "market share" of homicides that are capital
homicides. Model 4 introduces the deterrence components, with time as a
linear function. Model 5 again specifies time as a quadratic term.
The results replicate the pattern for the trajectory analyses shown in
Table 3. We see once again the absence of deterrent effects from either the
presence of a death statute or any of the components of deterrence. 181 The
parameter estimates in the lower portion of Table 4 for each of the components of the death penalty are low, and they are not statistically significant.
Similar to the results in Table 3, the significant negative estimate for
noncapital homicides suggests that "market share" of homicides that are
capital-eligible is growing even as the noncapital rate falls.

181. There is one weak positive effect in Model 5, but in the overall pattern of nonsignificance,
this may be a chance result lacking validation in other specifications.
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Figure 5: Capital-eligible homicide rates, adjusted for deterrence
components, noncapital homicide rates, punishment risk and covariates, by
executions lagged 1 and 2 years
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We illustrate the results for Model 4 in Table 4 graphically in Figure 5.
The graph shows a Lowess-smoothed function of the relationship between
capital-eligible homicide rates and executions lagged one and two years,
along with upper and lower bounds of the 95% confidence interval. The upper portion of Figure 5 shows the relationship of executions per state-year
lagged by one year to the rate of capital-eligible homicides in death penalty
states only, adjusted for the effects of the death penalty components,
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incarceration risks, and the socioeconomic covariates that were included in
each of the regression models in Table 4. The lower portion of Figure 5
shows the relationship of the same adjusted rates of capital-eligible homicides to executions lagged by two years. The figures also include upper and
lower 95% confidence intervals.
Both figures show the clustering of observations near zero for
executions, a reflection of the scarcity of executions. The overall flatness of
the curves-even at the extremes of execution frequency-is striking. Any
variation from year to year occurs by chance, and the overall picture is one of
no effect of the components of the death penalty on capital homicide rates.
As executions increase to approximately 18 in any year, the homicide rate
rises slightly. (Such high levels are exclusive to Texas.) The homicide rate
declines slightly for the next two observations before flattening out for the
remainder, which are widely spaced. In both figures, the lines are flat, and
the results in Table 4 suggest that any deviation from a zero slope is simply
chance within the confidence intervals.
Robustness checks are embedded in Tables 3 and 4, and include
estimations with alternate functional forms and with alternate measures of
the death penalty. First and most important, we estimated models using conventional fixed effects regression methods for panel data, with state and year
factors modeled as fixed effects in a pooled, cross-sectional analysis. The
alternative, a trajectory or growth curve analysis, estimates changes in slopes
through time between groups and identifies factors that contribute to slope
differences after controlling for random intercepts that represent different
starting points for each state observation.1 82 Each set of models was estimated with an alternate explanation for deterrence through incarceration risk.
The models include a rich set of covariates that assesses the effects of factors
that also may influence the homicide rate. Second, the results were stable
using two operational definitions of the death penalty and two conceptualizations of deterrence. The convergence of results in Tables 3 and 4, with
models that use different functional forms and specifications, provides strong
evidence of the robustness of the empirical estimates.
We also estimated the same sets of models using only the rate of felony
murders (logged) as the dependent variable. Felony murder is the most
prevalent form of capital-eligible homicide, accounting for more than half the
capital-eligible homicides nationwide and also in Texas. The results were
183
unchanged: there were no significant effects for the deterrence variables.
Once again, the noncapital homicide rate is the strongest predictor of felony

182. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.

183. Data

and

tables

are

available

http://www2.law.columbia.edu/fagan/researchdata/caphom/.

from

the

authors

at
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murders, showing the growing market share of homicides that are capitaleligible.
While these internal comparisons are important tests, the apparent
inelasticity of capital homicides over time and across states suggests that
there is simply not all that much variance to explain in these multivariate
models. Certainly, the overall homicide rate varies extensively over time and
between states, as well as between death penalty states. This is the basis of
nearly all deterrence tests over the past decade.1 84 But the rate of capitaleligible homicides varies little over time or between states. And, the scarcity
of executions in most states except Texas, also leaves little variance left to be
explained by the "right hand side" of these equations. So, while robustness
tests are critical in the face of difficult empirical estimations, the task here is
simpler and less vulnerable to misspecification. We are confident in the robustness of these analyses and estimates.
B. CapitalHomicide and Deterrence in Texas
There are three differences in the analysis for Texas compared to the
state-analyses. First, the models are estimated with a Poisson distribution of
the count of capital-eligible homicides, with the counts scaled to the
population of each of the 254 counties in the state. The sparseness of capital
homicides in most counties in most years required this approach. The result
was a high incidence of rates of zero or very low rates in most counties. The
simple fact of low rates and near invariance over time complicated the
regression analyses that were based on linear models that assumed normal
distributions. Even log transformations, which would impose a less skewed
structure on the data, did not create conditions amenable to the same type of
analysis that we used for the state models.
Accordingly, we use
overdispersed Poisson regression models with fixed effects for the deterrence
measures and random intercepts and random slopes to more efficiently
estimate trends of murders through time.
Second, only statewide measures of death sentences and punishment
risks (state prison populations) were available. County-level information
was not available for the entire time period of interest in this analysis. We
include the state-level predictor; however, as a statewide constant, it varies
by year but not by county within years. 185 Execution data were available by

184. See supra notes 9-16, 129 and accompanying text.
185. None of the options to address this limitation were acceptable. All solutions required an
estimation method to allocate inmates to counties as a function of population and crime rates.
However, the empirical literature on criminal sentencing suggests that there are unobservable

factors in states and local courts that shape sentencing practices and produce disparities by crime
type, race, and other population characteristics. Any allocation formula would be unable to
measure, much less identify statistically, the sources of these disparities, many of which lie in local
politics and local legal cultures. See, e.g., EISENSTEIN & JACOB, supra note 110; MARTHA A.
MYERS & SUSETTE M. TALARICO, THE SOCIAL CONTEXTS OF CRIMINAL SENTENCING 1 (1987)
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county and year. Since the analysis focuses on a single state with the death
penalty, we include estimates only of the deterrent effects of the components
of capital punishment. Texas had its first death sentence in 1977 and its first
execution in 1982. Because of limitations in county-level data in Texas, the
study period is 1978-200.186 Third, Models 3-5 include a dummy variable
for Harris County, to capture the unique effects of the concentration of Texas
1 87
executions in, that county.
The models in Table 5 show no evidence of deterrent effects of capital
punishment on the incidence of capital-eligible homicides in Texas counties.
Neither death sentences nor executions are significant in any of the three
models that test these effects in conjunction with other county- or state-level
factors. The signs for the parameter estimates of executions at times are
positive and other times are negative, a sign of instability in the estimates
given the tight temporal spacing of the time lags. The parameter estimates
for the statewide death sentence rates also are small and not statistically
significant.

(exploring the "linkages between the social order and criminal sentencing" by "[flocusing on the
county, court, and temporal contexts").
186. Models were estimated with and without Moran's I statistic for spatial autocorrelation in
total homicide rate with adjacent Texas counties. The results with and without the spatial measures
were identical, and the measure of spatial lag was not significant in any of the models. Texas
counties are large areas, and it is not surprising that the parameters for spatial lag were not
statistically significant. Accordingly, we report here the results without the spatial measures.
187. The dummy variable is included only in Tables 3-5. In the fixed effects regressions in
Models 1 and 2, Harris County effects are captured as part of the fixed effects estimation.
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Table 5: Poisson regressions of capital-eligible homicide rate by deterrence
and punishment, Texas, 1978-2002188
Fixed effects
Predictor
Noncapital homicide
rate

Model 1
.0007*
(.0003)

Executions (lag 1)
Executions (lag 2)
Death sentence (3 yr
moving average)
Punishment index
(lagged, logged)

-.099
(.112)

Model 2
.001""
(.0004)
.013
(.009)
.002
(.009)
-.015
(.024)
-.021
(.186)

Trajectory
Model 3
.002"**
(.0004)

.149
(.077)

Model 4

Model 5

°* "

.002
(.0005)
.054
(.051)
-.013
(.053)
-.016
(.011)
.049
(.086)

.002"**
(.0004)
.044
(.033)
-.005
(.032)
-.018
(.007)
-.0002
(.049)

.000
(.000)
-.002
(.003)
.001
(.003)
-.0003
(.001)
-.006
(.006)

.000
(.000)
.000
(.000)
.000
(.000)
.000
(.000)
-.0002
(.0002)

Interactionswith time
Noncapital homicide
rate

.000
(.000)

Executions (lag 1)
Executions (lag 2)
Death sentence (3 yr
moving average)
Punishment index
(lagged, logged)

-.014*
(.005)

County fixed effects
Year fixed effects
Covariates

0l

Time*Time

El
El

El

Fl

El

BIC

10929

10951

26878

26995

27050

N

5,458

5,456

5,458

5,456

5,456

Random intercepts

z

Significance: *** = p <.001, ** = p <.01, * = p < .05.

188. In Models 3-5, measures for each year were nested within counties, thereby controlling for
each county's unique effects over time.
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Figure 6 illustrates graphically the results of Table 5, Model 4. Figure 6
plots the predicted number of capital homicides in each Texas county-year as
a function of executions in the county in the previous year and the previous
two years. The graph shows a Lowess-smoothed function of the bivariate
relationship, along with upper and lower bounds of the 95% confidence
interval. As in Figure 5, the upper portion of Figure 6 shows the relationship
of executions per county-year lagged by one year to the incidence of capitaleligible homicides, adjusted for the effects of the death penalty components,
incarceration risks, and the socioeconomic covariates that were included in
each of the regression models in Table 5. The lower portion of Figure 6
shows the relationship of the same adjusted incidence of capital-eligible
homicides to executions lagged by two years. The figures also include upper
and lower 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure 6: Capital-eligible homicide counts in Texas counties, adjusted for
deterrence components, noncapital homicide counts, punishment risk and
covariates, by executions lagged 1 and 2 years
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As before, both figures show the clustering of observations near zero for
executions, a reflection of the scarcity of executions. The sparseness of executions and capital homicides produces a set of data points that are heavily
clustered around zero. The rise in the slope over time is simply by chance,
and is not a sign of a "brutalization" effect of capital punishment.
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The narrow confidence intervals result from the relative sparseness of
executions and the extreme right-skew of the distribution of capital-eligible
homicides across a large dataset with nearly 5,000 observations. There were
0 capital-eligible homicides in 3,346 county-years, and another 422 have
only 1. A few (3%) have more than 7 capital homicides, ranging widely
from 7 to 213 executions. Predicted homicide counts based on our models
are similarly skewed. Most (75%) observations are predicted to have less
than 0.563 capital homicides, and 95% are predicted to have fewer than four.
This distribution, heavily concentrated around low homicide counties, provides low standard errors of prediction, leading to narrow confidence
intervals. The standard errors for the predicted capital homicide counts are
quite narrow under these conditions, as seen in the tight confidence intervals
around the predicted homicide counts.
Similar to the state-level analyses, we also estimated the same set of
models using only the rate of felony murders (logged) as the dependent
variable. The pattern of results were unchanged compared to Table 5: there
were no significant effects for the deterrence variables. 189 As before, the
noncapital homicide rate is the strongest predictor of felony murders, again
showing the growing market share of homicides that are capital-eligible.
As in the national data, the inelasticity of capital homicides in Texas
leaves little variance to explain, and also little room for leverage or influence
by capital punishment. The relatively low incidence of capital homicides is
unaffected by sparse executions when disaggregated across 254 counties,
each with its own murder rate and unique conditions that shape the
differences between places and changes in homicide trajectories over time.
Expectations of capital punishment to influence capital homicides under
these conditions simply are unrealistic.' 90

189. Data
and
tables
are
available
from
the
authors
at
http://www2.law.columbia.edu/fagan/researchdata/caphom/.
190. One important influence omitted from this analysis is the effect of drug markets on
homicides. See, e.g., Eric Baumer et al., The Influence of Crack Cocaine on Robbery, Burglary,
and Homicide Rates: A Cross-City, LongitudinalAnalysis, 35 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 316 (1998)
(analyzing the effect of crack cocaine on trends in burglary, robbery, and homicide); Daniel Cork,
Examining Space-Time Interaction in City-Level Homicide Data: Crack Markets and the Diffusion
of Guns Among Youth, 15 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 379 (1999) (examining the connection
between the expansion of the use of crack cocaine and the growth in homicide rates); see also
Roland G. Fryer Jr. et al., Measuring the Impact of Crack Cocaine (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. W1 1318, 2005), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=-720405. Markets usually
are measured, however imperfectly, by drug arrest rates. See Richard Rosenfeld & Scott H. Decker,
Are Arrest Statistics a Valid Measure of Illicit Drug Use? The Relationship Between Criminal
Justice and Public Health Indicators of Cocaine, Heroin, and Marijuana Use, 16 JUST. Q. 685
(1999) (examining "alternative indicators" of illicit drug use besides drug arrests). However, data
on drug arrests for Texas and the nation were unavailable systematically before 1985, and the
coverage in the UCR databases is inconsistent. Moreover, homicides in drug transactions-other
than so-called "drug kingpin" murders-rarely qualify as death-eligible under the statutes either in
Texas or across the nation. Although federal law explicitly authorizes the death penalty for some
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Conclusion

All of the recent studies claiming a relationship between death penalty
policy and homicide rates suffer from an important and avoidable
aggregation error: they examine the relationship between death penalty
variables and total non-negligent homicide rates, despite the fact that
three-fourths of all such killings do not meet the statutory criteria to be
eligible for the death penalty. This study isolated the quarter of all killings
that might qualify for death and used trends in these killings to test for marginal deterrent impact of death penalty policy. By using the FBI's
Supplementary Homicide Reports, we isolated the fewer than 25% of reported killings that include 95% of all cases that produce executions in the
United States. Almost all of the cases in this group are potentially eligible
for the death penalty if convicted. For the other 75% of all homicides, fewer
than 2% of all killings have any potential exposure to capital punishment.
Once these two types of killings have been separated, a natural method
of testing the influence of the death penalty is to look for distinctive
variations in the death-eligible killings that are consistent with marginal
execution risk deterrence. Since the risk of an execution is more than fifty
times greater in a death penalty state for the "death-eligible" cases, the variations in these cases but not the others should produce the distinctive
fingerprints of death penalty policy deterrence, both over time and crosssectionally.
But none of the distinctive patterns one might expect from marginal
death penalty deterrence can be found in the nearly three decades since
Gregg. Where the risk of execution goes up in a death penalty state, the
death-eligible cases where that risk should make a difference do not decline
more than the non-eligible cases, nor is the proportion of all homicides that
risk a capital sanction in death states any smaller in those states than it is in
states without any death penalty. An effective death penalty would produce
changes in this category of homicides: the market share of all homicide that
are death-eligible should decline in the face of the threat of execution. But
that is not the case.
In fact, the incidence of death-eligible cases in those states is
remarkably stable over time, insensitive to variations in the incidence of

"drug kingpins" under the 1988 Drug Kingpin Act, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7001, 102 Stat. 4181,
4387 (1988) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 848 (2000 & Supp. 2006)), such laws are rarely
used by the states. Prior to the expansion of the federal death penalty in 1994, six persons were
sentenced to death in federal courts under this drug kingpin statute. Death Penalty Info. Ctr., The
Federal Death Penalty, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=29&did=147.
Our
analysis of the 100 most recent executions in state courts and the 50 most recent cases in Texas did
not include anyone convicted under drug kingpin statutes, nor were any lower-level drug dealers
identified in this exercise. Accordingly, while drug markets are considerable in the overall
homicide rate, their omission from this analysis is inconsequential.
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executions or to the large swings from one decade to the next in the number
or rate of nondeath-eligible killings. Even in Texas, the leading execution
state by far in the nation, the proportion of death-eligible killings is no
smaller than in other categories of states, and there is no differential decline
in death-eligible killings as the execution rate increased in the 1980s and
1990s. The marginal deterrent threat of executions on trends in these
homicides would be plainly visible if it existed. This lack of effect obtains
when simple comparisons are made over time and cross-sectionally, and the
same pattern of non-effect persists when models to account for other
influences on homicide are added. There is simply no visible evidence of the
marginal deterrent impact of the death penalty on death-eligible killings.
There is an odd and rather sad irony in the persistent failure of modem
deterrence arguments to classify homicides by execution eligibility. In the
earlier era of less complex statistical comparisons, Thorsten Sellin tested the
impact of death penalty policy on specific types of killings like those of police officers. 19 1 At that time, the detailed classification by death eligibility of
most reported killings was not possible. The legal changes that made the
classifications used in this study possible were produced by the United States
Supreme Court cases of Furman192 and Gregg'93 and the pattern of state statute these cases required. So the capacity to control for death eligibility
increased after the 1970s, but the modem studies that proclaimed their statistical sophistication in citing strong deterrent effects from the death penalty
failed to distinguish between death-eligible and non-eligible cases.
Our search for death penalty deterrence where it should be a strong
influence on homicide rates has produced consistent results: the marginal
deterrent effect of the threat or example of execution on those cases at risk
for such punishment is invisible.

191. See SELLIN, supra note 25, at 52-59. Sellin's classic studies of more than fifty years ago
included particularly high risk categories of homicides, such as killings of police officers and prison
guards. See Thorsten Sellin, The Death Penalty and Police Safety, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra
note 124, at 138, 152 (finding little difference between the murder rates of police officers in death
penalty states and abolition states); Thorsten Sellin, Prison Homicides, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT,
supra note 124, at 154, 159 (finding that the threat of the death penalty had no effect in deterring

prison violence).
192. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
193. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
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Appendix A: A partial list of studies published after 1990 on the deterrent
effects of the death penalty
Harold J. Brumm & Dale 0. Cloninger, Perceived Risk of Punishment
and the Commission of Homicides: A Covariance Structure Analysis, 31 J.
ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 1 (1996).
Dale 0. Cloninger, Capital Punishment and Deterrence: A Portfolio
Approach, 24 APPLIED ECON. 645 (1992)
Dale 0. Cloninger & Roberto Marchesini, Execution and Deterrence:A
Quasi-ControlledGroup Experiment, 33 APPLIED ECON. 569 (2001).
Dale 0. Cloninger & Roberto Marchesini, Execution Moratoriums,
Commutations and Deterrence: The Case of Illinois, 38 APPLIED ECON. 967
(2006).
Hashem Dezhbakhsh et al., Does CapitalPunishment Have a Deterrent
Effect? New Evidencefrom PostmoratoriumPanel Data, 5 AM. L. & ECON.
REv. 344 (2003).
Hashem Dezhbakhsh & Joanna M. Shepherd, The Deterrent Effect of
Capital Punishment: Evidence from a "Judicial Experiment," 44 ECON.
INQUIRY 512 (2006).
Lawrence Katz et al., Prison Conditions, Capital Punishment, and
Deterrence, 5 AM. L. & ECON. REv. 318 (2003).
Zhiqiang Liu, Capital Punishment and the Deterrence Hypothesis:
Some New Insights and EmpiricalEvidence, 30 E. ECON. J. 237 (2004).
H. Naci Mocan & R. Kaj Gittings, Getting Off Death Row: Commuted
Sentences and the Deterrent Effect of CapitalPunishment, 46 J.L. & ECON.
453 (2003).
Joanna
Shepherd, Deterrence Versus Brutalization: Capital
Punishment's Differing Impacts Among States, 104 MICH. L. REv. 203
(2005).
Joanna M. Shepherd, Murders of Passion, Execution Delays, and the
Deterrence of CapitalPunishment,33 J. LEGAL STUD. 283 (2004).
Jon Sorensen et al., CapitalPunishment and Deterrence: Examining the
Effect of Executions on Murder in Texas, 45 CRIME & DELINQ. 481 (1999).
James A. Yunker, A New Statistical Analysis of Capital Punishment
IncorporatingU.S. PostmoratoriumData, 82 SOC. SCI. Q. 297 (2002).
Paul R. Zimmerman, Estimates of the Deterrent Effect of Alternative
Execution Methods in the United States: 1978-2000, 65 AM. J. ECON. &
SOC. (forthcoming 2006).
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Paul R. Zimmerman, State Executions, Deterrence,and the Incidence of
Murder, 7 J. APPLIED ECON. 163 (2004).
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Appendix B: Data domains and sources
Domain
Homicide rates and
characteristics

Execution counts and statute
information

Death sentence counts

I

Source
State and county homicide totals are taken from
Uniform Crime Reports [United States]: Supplementary
Homicide Reports, 1976-2003 (ICPSR Study No. 4351,
2005), availableat
http://webapp.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/ICPSRSTUDY/04351.xml. The SupplementaryHomicide
Reports were filtered to exclude the deaths in New York
associated with the attacks of September 11, 2001, but
include those associated with the Oklahoma City bombing
of April 19, 1995.
Homicides in the following SHR categories were
designated potentially capital murders: killings committed
during crimes (rape, robbery, burglary, larceny, arson, car
theft), multiple-victims killings, killings of persons
younger than 6 years old, "gangland" homicides, sniper
killings, killings of police officers, and institution killings.
Homicides committed by offenders less than sixteen years
old were excluded from the "potentially capital" pool.
Supplementary Homicide Reports were compared to the
aggregated Uniform Crime Reports at both the state-year
and county-year levels to identify undercounts in the SHR
data. State-years and county-years when observations
undercounted the UCR homicide totals by at least 25%
were excluded from the analysis. The final sample
included 1,115 state-years of data, and 5,991 county-years
of data.
State execution data and dates of death penalty
reinstatement were compiled from the execution database
of the Death Penalty Information Center (DPIC),
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions.php. County
execution data for Texas were obtained from the Texas
Department of Criminal Justice,
http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/stat/executedoffenders.htm.
Executions in Texas were assigned to counties based on
the offender's county of conviction.
Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Capital Punishment in the United States, 1973-2002
(ICPSR Study No. 3958, 2004), availableat
http://webapp.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/ICPSRSTUDY/03958.xml.
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The LEOKA data is available from the InterUniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research,
in the following reports: Fed. Bureau of Investigation, U.S.
Dep't of Justice, Uniform Crime Reporting Program Data
[United States]: Police Employee (LEOKA) Data, 2003
(ICPSR Study No. 4269, 2005), availableat
http://webapp.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/NACJDDAS/04269.xml; Fed. Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Dep't
of Justice, Uniform Crime Reporting Program Data
[United States]: Police Employee (LEOKA) Data, 2002
(ICPSR Study No. 3996, 2004), available at
http://webapp.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/ICPSRSTUDY/03996.xml; Fed. Bureau of Investigation, U.S.
Dep't of Justice, Uniform Crime Reporting Program Data
(United States]: Police Employee (LEOKA) Data, 2001
(ICPSR Study No. 3749, 2002), available at
http://webapp.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/ICPSRSTUDY/03749.xml; Fed. Bureau of Investigation, U.S.
Dep't of Justice, Uniform Crime Reporting Program Data
[United States]: Police Employee (LEOKA) Data, 2000
(ICPSR Study No. 3445, 2002), available at
http://webapp.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/ICPSRSTUDY/03445.xml; Fed. Bureau of Investigation, U.S.
Dep't of Justice, Uniform Crime Reporting Program Data
[United States]: Police Employee (LEOKA) Data, 1999
(ICPSR Study No. 3165, 2001), available at
http://webapp.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/ICPSRSTUDY/03165.xml; Fed. Bureau of Investigation, U.S.
Dep't of Justice, Uniform Crime Reporting Program Data
[United States]: Police Employee (LEOKA) Data, 1998
(ICPSR Study No. 2907, 2001), available at
http://webapp.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/ICPSRSTUDY/02907.xml; Fed. Bureau of Investigation, U.S.
Dep't of Justice, Uniform Crime Reporting Program Data
[United States]: 1975-1997 (ICPSR Study No. 9028,
2005), availableat
http://webapp.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/ICPSRSTUDY/09028.xml.
State data on drug arrests 1985-2003 are aggregated
from annual files of county-level crimes and arrests,
Uniform Crime Reporting Program Data [United States]:
County-Level Detailed Arrest and Offense Data (various
years), available from University of Michigan, InterUniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research,
http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/.
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State population, socioeconomic, age structure and
racial composition data from 1970 to 2000 were obtained
from the U.S. Bureau of the Census, Population Estimate
Archives, http://www.census.gov/popestlarchives/. Age
structure data for 2000-2003 were obtained from the
United States Census Bureau, Population Estimates by
State, http://www.census.gov/popest/states/asrh/SCest2004-02.html. State population and racial composition
data are taken from the United States Census Bureau,
Population Estimate Archives,
http://www.census.gov/popest/archives/. Projections for
intra-census years in the 1970s, 1980s, and 2000s were
obtained from by the Bureau of the Census. Bureau of the
Census, Intercensal County Estimates by Age, Sex, Race:
1970-1979, http://www.census.gov/popest/archives/pre1980/co-asr-7079.html; Bureau of the Census, Intercensal
Estimates of the Resident Population of States and
Counties 1980-1989,
http://www.census.gov/popest/archives/1980s/e8089co.txt;
Bureau of the Census, 1990 to 1999 Annual Time Series of
County Population Estimates by Age, Sex, Race, and
Hispanic Origin,
http://www.census.gov/popest/archives/l 990s/CO-9912.html; Bureau of the Census, 2000s,
http://www.census.gov/popest/archives/2000s/. Census
indicia for the decade 1990-2000 census were
interpolated.
Urbanization. Annual estimates of the percentage of
state population residing in urban areas were obtained
from the U.S. Census Bureau, Census of the Population
1990 and 2000, http://factfinder.census.gov. Mid-census
data points were linearly interpolated. For 1988 and 1989,
the percentage of the population in urban areas was taken
from the Statistical Abstracts of the United States.
Poverty. The percentage of each state's population
with incomes below the poverty line was taken from the
Census Bureau's annual poverty estimates, available at
http://factfinder.census.gov (last visited Jan. 11, 2005).
Inequality. State-level Gini coefficients were taken
from the Census Bureau's "families" estimates for 1969,
1979, 1989, and 1999, available at
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/histinc/state/stat
e4.html. Intervening years were linearly interpolated.
Gini family estimates were used instead of household
estimates since the latter were unavailable for 1969. In
comparisons of Gini family estimates with Gini household
estimates for the 1979-99 period, the household estimates
generally were higher than the family estimates by no
more than five percentage points for any of the
measurement points, and they had parallel trends over
time. County-level Gini coefficients for Texas also were
taken from the U.S. Census Bureau and linearly
interpolated for intra-census years.
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State-level punishment indices are computed as the
ratio of the number of inmates incarcerated in the state in
the relevant year per 100 FBI Index Crimes committed in
the state in that year. Annual state prison population data
are taken from the National Corrections Reporting
Program. Data are from electronic spreadsheets available
from Bureau of Justice Statistics Spreadsheets-Crime &
Justice Electronic Data Abstracts,
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/dtdata.htm#prisoners. Data
from 1999-2003 are taken from the See BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK
OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS-2003 (Ann L. Pastore

Robbery rates

Spatial statistics

& Kathleen Maguire eds., 2004), availableat
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook.
State-level robbery rates also were recorded from the
county-level FBI Uniform Crime Reports, 1970-2005.
County-level robbery complaints for Texas were recorded
from the FBI Uniform Crime Reports, 1978-2001 (data for
1985 were missing).
Spatially lagged homicide rates were computed for
Texas counties based on Uniform Crime Report county
homicide counts for each year. Counties were designated
as "neighboring" if they shared a border. We computed a
Moran's I, a weighted correlation coefficient used to detect
departures from spatial randomness. Departures from
randomness indicate spatial patterns, such as clusters. The
statistic may identify other kinds of pattern such as
geographic trend, including a lagged effect. The spatial
lag was computed as the correlation of county homicide
rates with the average murder rate in surrounding counties.
See LUc ANSELIN, GEODA 0.951 RELEASE NOTES (2004);
Luc Anselin et al., GeoDa: An Introduction to Spatial
Data Analysis, 38 GEOGRAPHICAL ANALYSIS 5 (2006).
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Appendix C: Means and standard deviations of key outcomes and predictors,
1978-2003194

All states

Death
penalty
states

Nondeath
penalty
states

Texas

Harris

Capitaleligible
homicide
rate

1.47

1.62

1.16

2.31

4.36

(0.85)

(0.85)

(0.78)

(0.60)

(1.41)

Noncapital
homicide rate

4.90
(2.76)

5.46
(2.70)

3.73
(2.50)

8.81
(2.97)

13.61
(5.25)

Executions

0.72
(2.97)

0.98
(3.52)

0.18
(1.00)

12.52
(12.81)

2.90
(3.02)

Population

5,299,200

5,981,996

3,884,099

17,585,917

2,874,008

(5,647,348)

(6,114,259)

(4,196,685)

(2,314,260)

(299,058)

Robbery
complaint rate
(state-level)

147.1
(104.5)

159.6
(92.3)

121.1
(122.3)

198.5
(40.0)

55.7
(13.3)195

Poverty rate

12.7%
(3.8)

13.3%
(3.9)

11.7%
(3.2)

16.4%
(1.3)

14.1%
(1.9)

9.5%

11.7%

4.9%

11.7%

19.5%

(8.5)

(9.2)

(4.4)

(.2)

(.2)

1.49

1.60

1.25

1.76

(0.64)

(0.59)

(0.66)

(0.67)

% black
Ln
(punishment
index)

(gde(lagged, statelevel)

Inmate count

78,103

(TX counties
only)

(51,030)

% age 15-24

15.8%
(2.1)

15.7%
(2.1)

16.0%
(2.1)

16.3%
(1.7)

16.1%

Gini
coefficient

.39
(.03)

.40
(.03)

.38
(.02)

.43
(.02)

.43
(.06)

N

1,017

686

331

5,991

20

(1.8)

194. "Outlier" states and counties, in which the SHR murder count undercounts the UCR by
more than 25%, are omitted. Counties missing one or more of the predictors are also omitted,
leaving N observations.
195. Robbery complaints for Harris County are county-specific reports. Texas county panel is
1978-1998.
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